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Abstract 
 
This article presents the underlying vision for the 
argument that principles of liberal neutrality pose a genuine 
obstacle to freedom in democratic society.  There is a 
growing concern that liberty and justice are unattainable in 
modern democratic societies that are grounded in 
neutrality, including the United States.  Experience has 
demonstrated significant shortcomings of the modern 
freedom movements grounded in political theories, 
which—along with the theory of neutrality—reject the need 
for core substantive values to guide law and policy.  The 
underlying basis of such theories is a particular modern 
conception of freedom.  But a well-grounded and reasoned 
alternative vision of human freedom exists: a distinctively 
Christian vision of human freedom as understood in light of 
the philosophical and theological study of God’s revelation 
to man.  A comprehensive treatment of the Christian vision 
of human freedom can be gleaned from the scholarly work 
of Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, currently Pope Emeritus 
Benedict XVI.  From this alternative perspective, freedom 
is promoted and safeguarded only when core substantive 
values and moral insights are respected as the point of 
reference for law and justice in society, a condition which 
posits a role for the State in prudently fostering respect for 
those values and insights.  Because this alternative vision is 
often misunderstood, the purpose of this article is to present 
a concise but in-depth synthesis of the writings of 
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Ratzinger bearing on human freedom and democracy and to 
thereby encourage dialogue leading to a more moderate use 
of neutrality principles.   
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A Christian Vision of Freedom and Democracy: 
Neutrality as an Obstacle to Freedom 
 
“A confused ideology of liberty leads to a dogmatism 
that is proving ever more hostile to real liberty.”1 
 
Freedom has been a defining mark of modern and 
postmodern thought.  In the areas of science and 
technology, as well as the arenas of politics and sociology, 
freedom has been the objective.  But what is freedom?  
What is the best way to think about freedom?  In the 
modern era, the goals of science and technology have been 
to dominate nature, and the political goals have been to 
eliminate oppressive governing regimes and to end 
injustice and unjust discrimination based on differences in 
race, class, and other categorizations.   Undoubtedly, many 
good things have resulted from these goals.  But overall, 
the modern freedom movements have proved 
unsatisfactory.  In European societies, Marxist-based 
political and social theories led to tyranny and human 
devastation.  In the United States, the “unitedness” 
promised and envisioned has dissipated. And to many, 
liberty and justice are no longer perceived as possible 
because lawmaking and policy-making have been reduced 
to rule by the strongest.  The general direction of the 
modern quest for freedom surely must be right.  An 
                                                 
1
 JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 36 
(2006).  In this book, Ratzinger emphasizes that the main divide in 
contemporary society rests on the question of the existence of God. Id. 
at 40-45.  On the one side lies the great historical and religious cultures 
of humanity; on the other side lies a perspective reflecting humanity’s 
emancipation from God.  In its conclusion, this article affirms that this 
divide lies at the heart of the controversy regarding use of the neutrality 
principle.  The underlying premise of neutrality is a vision of freedom 
that, in essence, views family, morality, and God as antitheses to 
freedom.  These ideas will be discussed in Part I & Part IV(A) of this 
paper.        
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important question is why the modern approaches to 
freedom have gone awry.  
To many, the crux of the problem is society’s 
reliance on the idea of neutrality, a doctrine central to legal 
and political philosophy in the United States today.
2
  
Modern ideas of liberal neutrality rest on the premise that 
the state should not express preferences regarding 
substantive values or competing conceptions of good or, 
more specifically, the end toward which citizens should 
strive.
 3
  This is because, in the liberal tradition, judgments 
                                                 
2
 See, e.g., JAMES KALB, THE TYRANNY OF LIBERALISM: 
UNDERSTANDING AND OVERCOMING ADMINISTERED FREEDOM, 
INQUISITORIAL TOLERANCE, AND EQUALITY BY COMMAND (2d ed. 
2008); ROBERT H. DIERKER JR, THE TYRANNY OF TOLERANCE: A 
SITTING JUDGE BREAKS THE CODE OF SILENCE TO EXPOSE THE LIBERAL 
JUDICIAL ASSAULT (2006). See also CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND 
COMMUNITARIANISM (Kenneth L. Grasso, Gerard V. Bradley & Robert 
P. Hunt eds. 1995).  
3
 See, e.g., John M. Breen, Neutrality in Liberal Legal Theory and 
Catholic Social Thought, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 513, 513-97 
(2009) (providing a comparative analysis of neutrality and Catholic 
social teaching).   Breen explains that neutrality is widely considered a 
defining feature and virtue of that strand of American political 
philosophy referred to as liberalism; and that liberalism has provided 
the intellectual foundation for much of the American legal system. Id. 
at 514-15 & 517 (citing and quoting a number of influential works). See 
also WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND 
DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1991).  In America, the neutrality 
approach is perhaps most properly attributable to John Rawls.  Rawls 
rejected the idea that a “general moral conception” can provide the 
basis for a “public conception of justice” in a democratic society.  He 
advocated instead for an approach that rests on the “overlapping 
consensus” of a particular culture. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: 
Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 225 (1985), 
available at 
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Courses/RawlsJustic
e.pdf  In his mind, this was because “we – we modern inheritors of the 
traditions of religious tolerance and constitutional government – put 
liberty ahead of perfection.”  See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE (1971).   
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concerning what is good, the ends in life worthy of pursuit, 
are subjective; no conception of what is good exists that 
would warrant attempts to coerce dissenters.
4
  Being 
neutral means that all values and viewpoints are regarded 
as equal.
5
  Scholars have pointed out deficiencies 
associated with the principle of neutrality.  For example, 
they say that it is unworkable and illusory to the point of 
being deceptive.
6
  But this creates a new question: if 
society needs substantive values to guide policy-making, 
what values should be selected?  This is the stumbling 
block for many people.   
In the United States, significant support exists for 
the idea that core Christian values should provide the 
foundation for law and justice.  Indeed, for much of the 
history of the United States, Christian values were the 
foundation for society.  It is only because of the neutrality 
principle—especially as imposed by the United States 
Supreme Court in the arena of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence
7—that the idea has been increasingly 
quashed.  In a recent Establishment Clause case, Justice 
                                                 
4
 Breen, supra note 3, at 525-26 (drawing on ANDREW ALTMAN, 
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990)).  Breen notes 
that “because the nature of the good is unsettled, contested, and always 
open to dispute, liberalism holds that it is never appropriate to use the 
coercive power of the state to mandate a particular theory of the good.”  
Id. at 526.    
5
 See Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 
305, 311-12 (1990) (explaining neutrality as advocated in Bruce 
Ackerman’s theory of liberal justice and Ronald Dworkin’s theory of 
rights).  
6
 See, e.g., id.  As explained by Dean Steven Smith, neutrality is 
illusory and impotent.  It cannot guide public policy; cannot garner 
respect of citizens; and, in fact, operates in a way that is deceptive to 
the public. Id. at 313-29. Cf. Galston, supra note 3, at 3-21.  The 
citations in footnote 2 above also address this idea. 
7
 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) 
(landmark case in which the Supreme Court adopted the neutrality 
principle in the context of the Establishment Clause). 
5
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O’Connor, an advocate of the view that it is impermissible 
for state action to give rise to even a subtle feeling of 
exclusion (i.e., to make a person aware that his or her 
religious views might be out of sync with more mainstream 
religious views), suggested that reconsidering use of the 
neutrality principle was unthinkable.  After noting the 
existence of strong religious sentiments in the United 
States, which she attributes to judicial enforcement of the 
form of neutrality that cabins religious views to the private 
realm, Justice O’Connor essentially stated: “Why would we 
want any other approach?”8   
Importantly, however, if the principle of neutrality 
itself is misguided—if “unitedness” has been lost and 
democratic government has been reduced to rule by the 
strongest—the idea that core Christian values should 
provide a foundation for law and justice should be rejected 
only for sound substantive reasons.  A key purpose of this 
article is to explain why acceptance of core Christian 
values as guideposts can better safeguard liberty and 
justice.  A sound argument exists that liberty and justice in 
society depend on state recognition of, and prudent use of, 
core Christian values in policy-making.
9
  In response to 
                                                 
8
 See McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 882 
(2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor had pointed to 
violence in other areas of the world resulting from “assumption of 
religious authority by government.”  She then states: “Those who 
would renegotiate the boundaries between church and state must 
therefore answer a difficult question: Why would we trade a system 
that has served us so well for one that has served others so poorly?”  Id.  
Her line of reasoning suggests a failure to appreciate that moving away 
from neutrality does not mean “assumption of religious authority by 
government.”  Rather, it would entail government respect for a source 
of moral authority beyond the state, which means that it would be 
beyond the majority vote.  
9
 This would not necessarily mean a return to state practices struck 
down by the Court due to Establishment Clause concerns.  Past reliance 
on Christian values in fashioning laws may not always have been 
“prudent” and may have involved values beyond the realm 
6
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Justice O’Connor’s question, society should want another 
approach because, in the quest for freedom, how humans 
live does matter.   
Notably, the case for a more tempered use of 
neutrality has been persuasively presented in the work of 
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, currently Pope Emeritus 
Benedict XVI.
10
  In addressing freedom and democracy, 
Ratzinger’s focus has mainly been on the situation in 
Europe.
11
  But his message is relevant to any society 
hoping to maintain a pluralistic democracy where liberty 
and justice are possible.  The crux of Ratzinger’s message 
is that freedom is promoted and safeguarded only when 
core Christian moral insights are respected as the 
foundation and point of reference for law and justice.  
Regarding the interaction between Christianity and political 
authority in a pluralistic democracy, Ratzinger’s 
philosophy perhaps is best captured by the statement that 
democracy must be lived “on the basis of Christianity and 
Christianity on the basis of the free democratic state.”12  
                                                                                                 
appropriately considered “core values.”  Cf. JOSEPH RATZINGER, 
VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 21-22 (2006) (noting that Christians 
have at times in the past expected too much from the “earthly city”).  
10
 Because the bulk of the writings considered in this article were 
written by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger before he was elected Pope, this 
paper uses the name Ratzinger in both the text of the paper and in 
citations.  
11
See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, EUROPE TODAY AND TOMORROW: 
ADDRESSING THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES (Michael J. Miller trans., 
Ignatius Press 2d ed. 2007) (2004). See also JOSEPH RATZINGER AND 
MARCELLO PERA, WITHOUT ROOTS: THE WEST, RELATIVISM, 
CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM (2007); JOSEPH RATZINGER, A TURNING POINT 
FOR EUROPE? THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD: ASSESSMENT AND 
FORECAST (Brian McNeil trans., Ignatius Press, 2d ed. 1994) (1991) 
[hereinafter Ratzinger, A Turning Point].  
12
 JOSEPH RATZINGER, A Christian Orientation in a Pluralistic 
Democracy?: The Indispensability of Christianity in the Modern Age, 
in CHURCH, ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY 
204, 215 (Robert Nowell trans., Crossroad Pub. Co. 1st Am. Ed.1988) 
(1987) [hereinafter Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation].  
7
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The first half of this statement of course meets strong 
resistance in today’s culture.  Nonetheless, Ratzinger has 
been adamant that, although the distinct spheres of Church 
and State must be respected,
13
 a society electing a 
democratic government must recognize as inviolable a 
certain basic set of values and those values having a 
Christian foundation.
14
  To Ratzinger, the existence of these 
values was a precondition for democracy, and adherence to 
these values is necessary for the survival of democracy.
15
  
                                                 
13
 See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Theology and the Church’s Political 
Stance, in CHURCH, ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN 
ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 152, 161-62 [hereinafter Ratzinger, 
Political Stance] (noting that where the Church itself becomes the state, 
freedom becomes lost; but, also, that freedom is lost when the Church 
is precluded from being a public and publically relevant authority).  
Ratzinger has also acknowledged that, in the past, the Church has at 
times overstepped its bounds.  The Church at times has expected too 
much from civil society in terms of the Christian norms it expected to 
be recognized by the state and, at times, has over-asserted its claim to 
public legal status.  See, e.g., Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra 
note 12, at 212-13.  
14
 Ratzinger explains that Christianity provides the rational foundation 
for ethics; ethics remains rational only when reason is purified by faith; 
and a Christian foundation “is imperative precisely if [the state] is to 
remain the state and pluralist.”  Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, 
supra note 12, at 216-18.  The necessary purification of reason by faith 
(and vice versa) occurs within the context of Christianity and the 
Church. See Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 158-60.  As 
explained below, truth exists in the world because it is a product of the 
Eternal Reason that is Love, also known as God.  Humans have access 
to the truth, but only with the assistance of revelation from God.  The 
Church, understood in its fullness, is the “place where [Truth] is 
perceived.”  Id. at 160.  
15
 “The state must recognize that a basic framework of values with a 
Christian foundation is the precondition for its existence.  It must in 
this sense as it were simply recognize its historical place, the ground 
from which it cannot completely free itself without collapsing.  It must 
learn that there is a continued existence of truth which is not subject to 
consensus but which precedes it and makes it possible.”  Ratzinger, A 
Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 219.  Ratzinger also stresses 
that democracy was formulated precisely to preserve inviolable values 
8
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Because it is largely a matter of historical fact that 
Christian values were a precondition for democracy,
16
 the 
more controversial assertion is the claim that moral insights 
from the Christian tradition are necessary for the survival 
of democracy.  Indeed, this perspective may be 
incomprehensible to persons influenced by the pervasively 
secular culture present in contemporary society.  But the 
perspective is challenging to understand even for Christians 
and others who would be open to the idea. 
For that reason, in this article I strive to help make 
this perspective of freedom and democracy comprehensible 
and, in particular, to do so largely using the work of 
Cardinal Ratzinger.
17
   It is useful and appropriate to focus 
on Ratzinger’s scholarly writings for a number of reasons.  
Ratzinger is recognized for his strong intellectual 
capabilities and his ability to communicate his ideas clearly 
and succinctly.
18
  His writings also reveal a genuine attempt 
                                                                                                 
and rights.  See JOSEPH RATZINGER, What is Truth, in VALUES IN A 
TIME OF UPHEAVAL 55 (2006). 
16
 Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 215 n. 11 
(While democracy is a product of the fusion of Greek and Christian 
heritage, it was, more specifically, “formed under the particular 
conditions of the American Congregationalist pattern;” it is not a 
product of the so-called Enlightenment era, nor of the European 
Reformation movement).    
17
 Ratzinger’s ideas and teaching on human freedom and democratic 
society are fully consistent with Catholic teaching generally, especially 
as presented in important papal encyclicals and instructions addressing 
Catholic social doctrine.  See, e.g., J. BRIAN BENESTAD, CHURCH, 
STATE, AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO CATHOLIC SOCIAL 
DOCTRINE (2011) (presenting Catholic social doctrine, but also usefully 
integrating the particular contributions of various popes, including Pope 
Benedict XVI).  See generally MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: 
COMMENTARIES & INTERPRETATIONS, (Kenneth R. Himes et al. eds., 
2005).  
18
 See, e.g., D. VINCENT TWOMEY, THE ESSENTIAL POPE BENEDICT 
XVI: HIS CENTRAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES xvii-xix (John F. 
Thornton & Susan B. Varenne eds.,HarperOne reprint ed. 2008) 
(commenting on the “breathtaking scope” of Ratzinger’s corpus of 
9
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to understand and address opposing positions.
19
  
Additionally, Ratzinger addressed issues bearing on the 
foundations of political and social order in a somewhat 
systematic way throughout his career.  Because his work 
represents an impressive integration and synthesis of 
theology, philosophy and politics, he has gained respect as 
a profound political thinker whose ideas are rich and 
coherent.
20
   
Accordingly, this article first frames the issue as 
one of properly understanding human freedom and then 
presents the basic Christian vision.  Next, the article 
presents a synthesis of Ratzinger’s writings bearing on 
human freedom to help flesh out the deeper philosophical 
and theological foundation for the Christian vision; namely, 
its grounding in the existence of a personal God and the 
perceptions and conceptions arising from deep reflection on 
the Trinity and the Incarnation.  Such study reveals 
intelligibility in creation that must be respected. 
Specifically, it reveals that within each human being there 
exists an existential capacity designed to reach beyond the 
self and toward God and others, a capacity fulfilled by re-
union with God and others.  Freedom, then, is living one’s 
life in a manner that helps one to achieve that union, and 
Christian values—which are consistent with the 
intelligibility in creation—thereby promote human 
freedom.  Ratzinger’s work presents a strong argument that 
                                                                                                 
intellectual work, on its originality, creativity, and consistency, and on 
Ratzinger’s attention to the ideas of “the great thinkers of humanity, 
theologians and otherwise”).   
19
 Id. at xix (noting that all of Ratzinger’s writings reveal his “courage 
to face any question or objection because of the confidence he has in 
the Truth revealed in Jesus Christ and handed on by the church’s 
apostolic tradition”). 
20
 See, e.g., THOMAS R. ROURKE, THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
THOUGHT OF BENEDICT XVI 3-4 (2011), 3-4 (explaining that 
Benedict’s social thought merits considerably more attention than it has 
received). 
10
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foundational judgments concerning the ends in life worthy 
of pursuit are not solely subjective.  Rather, freedom is an 
integral aspect of the human person, and thus, how freedom 
is used matters—and matters beyond the personal or 
private, subjective sphere.    
Furthermore, because survival of democracy hinges 
on sufficient unity among the citizens regarding the values 
deemed inviolable,
21
 Ratzinger advocates that the state has 
a role in prudently fostering respect for those values, 
including expecting reverence and respect for God and holy 
things, and encouraging serious study of questions such as 
the existence of and nature of God.
22
  Again, this 
                                                 
21
 See JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom and Constraint in the Church, in 
CHURCH, ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY, 
supra note 12, at 183, 188 [hereinafter Ratzinger, Freedom and 
Constraint] (“Ultimately, the democratic system can function only if 
certain fundamental values . . . are recognized as valid by everyone.” 
“[T]here must be an ethos which is jointly accepted and maintained 
even if its rational basis cannot be established absolutely and 
conclusively.”). See also Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 
12, at 205 (“Pluralist democracy, in itself, does not “unite[] its citizens 
in a fundamental assent to the state. . . .For its foundations, it depends 
on other powers and forces outside of itself.”); JOSEPH RATZINGER, 
Luther and the Unity of the Churches, in CHURCH, ECUMENISM & 
POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 99, 131 
[hereinafter Ratzinger, Luther] (noting that “[a] formal unity without 
clear content is fundamentally no unity at all.”  Unity based on 
common skepticism and not knowledge is, in essence, based on 
capitulation). 
22
 See, e.g., Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 218-
20.   Ratzinger is clear, however, in placing the primary responsibility 
for cultivating the spiritual foundation of society on the Church and 
Christians.  Id. See also JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom, Law, and the 
Good, in VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 52 (2006) (emphasizing the 
public task of Christian churches:  they must be free to “address the 
freedom of all human beings so that the moral forces of history may 
remain forces in the present”); JOSEPH RATZINGER, Biblical Aspects of 
the Question of Faith and Politics, in CHURCH, ECUMENISM & 
POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 147, 151 
(explaining that the core responsible political activity is to nurture 
11
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perspective is at odds with the neutrality principle imposed 
by the American judiciary, at least since the 1950s.
23
  Thus, 
this article also clarifies how Ratzinger’s vision of human 
freedom renders his approach to Church-State issues fully 
consistent with vigorous respect for religious freedom or 
freedom of conscience.  The bottom-line is that personal 
choices about how to live matter, and it is permissible for 
the state to foster a culture in which persons can more 
readily live in a genuinely human way—not through heavy-
handed or unnecessary measures, but through prudent 
adherence to a limited number of core values.   
 
V. The Overarching Issue: Properly Understanding 
Human Freedom 
 
In discussing democracy’s need for grounding itself 
in Christian moral insights and values, Ratzinger generally 
supports his message with a two-pronged approach.  Under 
the first prong, he points to and explains why prevalent 
political theories of the modern era have failed.  Under the 
second prong, he presents, in a variety of ways, his vision 
for safeguarding genuine human freedom.  This article 
focuses primarily on the second prong of his argument, but 
this section also briefly introduces Ratzinger’s perspective 
on the failures of modern political philosophies.  
In his writings, Ratzinger has demonstrated that 
political theories following the trajectory initiated by 
Rousseau-type thinkers are grounded in a radical 
philosophy of freedom and what he has labeled as the 
“secular trinity of ideas;” the three ideas are progress, 
absolutism of scientific technology, and political 
                                                                                                 
public acceptance of the validity of morality and God’s 
commandments). 
23
 In Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the 
Supreme Court adopted the neutrality principle in the context of the 
Establishment Clause. 
12
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messianism.
24
  Ratzinger characterizes the radical 
philosophy of freedom as encompassing the individualistic 
ideology that was a component of all Enlightenment 
thought, the anarchic tendencies flowing from Rousseau’s 
vision of human nature and the social contract where no 
right order exists and human will is the sole norm of human 
action,
25
 and the Marxist tendency to rely on structures and 
                                                 
24
 Ratzinger discusses two good examples of failures of modern 
philosophies. See Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 25-133; 
JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom and Liberation: The Anthropological 
Vision of the 1986 Instruction Libertatis Conscientia, in CHURCH, 
ECUMENISM & POLITICS, supra note 12, at 255, 256-265 [hereinafter 
Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation]. 
25
 Rousseau’s essay on the social contract was written in 1762.  See 
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR: PRINCIPLES OF 
POLITICAL RIGHT, (1762), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm [hereinafter Rousseau, Social 
Contract].  To Rousseau, the “sacred right” of the social order is built 
upon conventions, see id., Bk. I, ch. I., conventions that flow from 
Rousseau’s view of human nature.  See id. at Bk. I, ch. II.  To 
Rousseau, human beings differ from animals in only two respects: they 
can rise above instincts by an act of freedom or free will, and they have 
a faculty of self-preservation that develops all other faculties.  See 
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY 
25 (Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1992) (1755)). 
Rousseau’s notion of the social compact reflects these dual 
and limited aspects of human nature.  In his theory of the social 
contract, because humans cannot know what justice is, nothing exists to 
delimit the majority vote. See Rousseau, Social Contract, supra, at Bk 
II, ch. VI.  His concept of the “general will” is, in the end, the only 
limit on government, and persons are entitled to reclaim their natural 
rights and liberties when law and government fail to reflect the general 
will.  But Rousseau does not see the general will as being subject to any 
absolute measure.   
Rousseau’s philosophy stands in stark contrast to that of John 
Locke.  See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE 
ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1690), available 
at http://jim.com/2ndtreat.htm (also known as Locke’s Second Treatise 
on Government).  The second essay on civil government was drafted 
between 1685–1688.  See JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL 
GOVERNMENT AND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, (Sterling P. 
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systems to bring about justice.
26
  From this perspective, 
freedom generally is understood as:  
 
the possibility of doing 
everything one wants to do 
and of doing only what one 
would like to do oneself.  
Freedom understood in this 
way is a matter of doing what 
                                                                                                 
Lamprecht ed. 1937) [hereinafter Locke, Second Treatise].  Locke’s 
theory of the social contract rests solidly on an absolute measure that 
operates as a genuine limit on the “one will” that gives rise to political 
laws and acts of government.  To Locke, the nature of the social 
compact is inescapably tied to limits on human action existing in the 
state of nature before societies have consented to be governed: the law 
of God and the law of nature.  To Locke, this law stands as “an eternal 
rule to all men, legislators as well as others.”  See Locke, Second 
Treatise, id. at #135.  
Both Locke and Rousseau recognized consent of the people as 
the source of authority in civil society, namely, the consent arising 
upon agreement to be part of the society.  Both also propose that 
legitimate laws made within society will be grounded in the consent of 
the body politic, as determined by majority vote, and delimited by the 
notion of the common good of the community.  The key difference 
between Locke and Rousseau lies in the operation of and limits upon 
that “one will.”  Whereas in Rousseau’s theory the legislative power 
becomes, in essence, the source of the laws governing society, in 
Locke’s theory the legislative power serves a higher law, by making the 
law of God and the law of nature better known and fostering a more 
effective operation of the law for the general good of all.  Further, the 
majority vote in Locke’s theory serves only as a means to ensure that 
laws reflect the consent of society.  The majority vote remains 
subordinate to the law of God and the law of nature.  A majority vote 
inconsistent with the Eternal law would constitute a sign that the 
agreement has been breached, thereby legitimizing resort to the natural 
liberty to form a new society.  
26
 JOSEPH RATZINGER, Truth and Freedom, in THE ESSENTIAL POPE 
BENEDICT XVI: HIS CENTRAL WRITINGS & SPEECHES 336, 343 (New 
York: HarperOne, 2007) (John F. Thornton & Susan B. Varenne eds., 
HarperOne reprint ed. 2008)  [hereinafter Ratzinger, Truth and 
Freedom]. 
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one likes, of arbitrary whim. . 
. .  From this point of view 
liberation consists in throwing 
off constraints and 
obligations.  Every obligation 
appears as a shackle that 
restricts freedom; every 
obligation that is thrown off 
becomes a step forward on the 
road to freedom.  It is clear 
that from this kind of point of 
view the family, the Church, 
morality, and God must 
appear antitheses to freedom.  
God obliges men and women; 
morality is a basic form in 
which this obligation to him is 
expressed. . . .  Even the state, 
declared to be the ruler of man 
over man, becomes an 
opponent of freedom.
27
  
 
Ratzinger has noted that this perspective is grounded in a 
definite understanding of human nature, an understanding 
expressed most completely in the philosophy of Sarte:  
 
For Sarte man is pure 
existence without essence.  
There is no certainty about 
what he or she is or how he or 
she should be.  One must 
discover anew what it is to be 
human from the nothingness 
of an empty freedom. The idea 
                                                 
27
 Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra note 24, at 259-60.  
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of freedom is here pushed to 
its ultimate radical position, 
no longer merely 
emancipation from tradition 
and authority but 
emancipation from his or her 
own nature and essence, a 
state of complete 
indeterminacy which is open 
to anything.
28
    
 
To Ratzinger, history has shown that in reality these 
perspectives lead to the opposite of freedom and to human 
dissatisfaction.  The dissolution of traditional links and 
obligations, the dependence on large anonymous systems, 
and the alienation resulting when societal practices break 
down traditional structures such as family and Church 
have, in fact, “turned out more and more to be the pre-
condition for total dictatorship and totalitarian enforcement 
of conformity.”29     
Similar negative results flow from the interplay of 
the secular trinity of ideas of progress, absolutism of 
scientific technology, and political messianism.  Ratzinger 
has explained that the union of these ideas was most 
consistently developed in Marxism, emerging as a 
“political myth of almost irresistible power.”  But the union 
of these ideas also exists today, albeit in weaker forms, in 
Western society.
30
  These ideas also represent the exclusion 
                                                 
28
 Ratzinger, Freedom and Constraint, supra note 21, at 191.  The 
perspective is also thoroughly theological: “Behind all this there stands 
a programme which must ultimately be labeled theological: God is no 
longer recognized as a reality standing over against man, but instead 
man may himself or herself become what he or she imagines a divinity 
would be if it existed. . . .”  Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra 
note 24, at 260.  
29
 Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra note 24, at 262.    
30
 See Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 129-30.   
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of God from the shaping of history and human life.
31
  Ideas 
of progress and absolutism of scientific technology are 
grounded in a self-limitation of reason: a narrowing down 
of reason to the perception of what is quantitative and, thus, 
omits the insights common to almost the whole of mankind 
before the modern period.  In particular, this omits the 
conviction that morality is not created by man on the basis 
of calculation of expediency.  But, rather, man “finds it 
already present in the essence of things.”32  Without 
substantive values for guidance, “progress” becomes any 
new approach and any new technology necessarily is a 
good.
33
  Messianic approaches to governance place reliance 
on systems and structures and political and economic 
activity, rather than on ethical efforts of citizens.  These 
ideas reflect materialism and its program.
34
  As explained 
by Ratzinger, this brand of liberation depends on abdication 
of ethical principles and behavior and, therefore, abdication 
of responsibility and ultimately of conscience.
35
  And 
destruction or loss of conscience is “the precondition for 
totalitarian obedience and totalitarian domination.”36  The 
ultimate result of adhering to these political theories thus is 
not freedom but, rather, a type of slavery.
37
   
                                                 
31
 Id. at 130 (noting that, in essence, this trinity of ideas replaces and 
thus excludes the concept of God). 
32
 See id., 34. See also JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE 
CRISIS OF CULTURES, 39-45 (2006). 
33
 See JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 
41-42 (2006) (“[T]he guiding principle is that man’s capability 
determines what he does.  If you know how to do something, then you 
are also permitted to do it. . . . But man knows how to do many things, 
and this knowledge increases all the time.  If this knowledge does not 
find its criterion in a moral norm, it becomes a power for destruction. . . 
.”).  
34
 See Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 205-08. 
35
 Id.   
36
 Id. See also Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 165. 
37
 See Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 205-11 
(emphasizing also the break down of the rule of law and a loss of the 
17
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Ratzinger’s attention to and analysis of these 
shortcomings and failures is crucial.  If political 
philosophies divorced from substantive values or divorced 
from core Christian values were producing good results, his 
message would be moot.  But modern societies keep 
stumbling.  Even in the United States the situation seems 
precarious.  A prevalent sentiment exists that government, 
particularly at the federal level, is not working.  In each 
branch of government, law and policy is being made on the 
basis of power.  Even citizens unfamiliar with political 
philosophies generally, or the doctrine of neutrality in 
particular, likely would agree that a key problem is the 
much divided nature of the electorate—a dividedness 
arising in large part because of the absence of societal 
consensus on core values.
38
  
After highlighting modern governments’ failures to 
achieve freedom, the second prong in Ratzinger’s approach 
explains that genuine human freedom is safeguarded only 
when democratic government and the majority vote are 
limited by inviolable moral standards and, more 
specifically, standards grounded in core Christian values.  
                                                                                                 
sense of transcendence that causes people to search for ways to escape 
society). See also CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, 
INSTRUCTION ON CHRISTIAN FREEDOM (March 22, 1986),  
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc
_con_cfaith_doc_19860322_freedom-liberation_en.html, at #10-19 
(noting, inter alia, the new forms of oppression arising from 
unrestrained use of technology, modern acts of terrorism, and 
collectivist approaches that quash human aspirations for the 
transcendent). 
38
 From Ratzinger’s perspective, the increasing dividedness in society 
is due in large measure to the overarching clash between those 
believing in dependence on God and those seeking emancipation from 
God: “The real antagonism typical of today’s world is not that between 
diverse religious cultures; rather, it is the antagonism between the 
radical emancipation of man from God, from the roots of life, on the 
one hand, and the great religious cultures, on the other.”  JOSEPH 
RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 44 (2006).  
18
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The importance of democratic government and the majority 
vote being delimited by inviolable moral standards should 
be fairly obvious.  As Ratzinger has emphasized, the 
history of the twentieth century has readily demonstrated 
that the majority can err—and err seriously.39  Those 
adhering to the neutrality principle tend to believe that the 
gross abuses that have occurred elsewhere will not happen 
in the United States.
40
  Frankly, that belief has no logical 
basis.  Nonetheless, another valid reason exists for holding 
the view that inviolable moral standards must exist to 
delimit the majority.  The idea of inviolable rights and 
standards was a key premise of the founding generation.  
The premise was part and parcel of the prevailing 
philosophies of the founding era and is spelled out in the 
                                                 
39
 The multiple instances of state sanctioned genocide is a prime 
example.  See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom, Law, and the Good, 
in VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 45-52 (2006) (pointing to the 
twentieth century totalitarian states).  Ratzinger also has often 
explained that failure to identify values to limit and guide the majority 
vote leads to radical relativism.  See, e.g., id. at 47, 56 (discussing 
Richard Rorty’s “utopia of banality” wherein a freedom without 
substance dissolves into meaninglessness). See also Ratzinger, Luther, 
supra note 21, at  131 (noting that authority based on skepticism 
becomes arbitrary).  The basic idea is simply that, without inviolable 
standards to delimit majority vote, law becomes nothing other than a 
mirror of whatever happens to be the predominant views or opinions of 
the moment—however egregious those may be. 
40
 See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, TRUTH AND PROGRESS: PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS (1998); RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND 
TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (1991).  Rorty adheres to the view that 
a certain “intuition” provides sufficient safeguards against egregious 
government acts.  Ratzinger compares Rorty’s views to certain 
seventeenth century ideas; namely the idea that there was a single, 
universal morality which was a true and clear light that could be 
perceived by all humans if they would but open their eyes.  Ratzinger 
explains that reliance on mere intuition is unworkable in contemporary 
society because the “evidential character” of moral principles no longer 
exists.  See JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom, Law, and the Good, in 
VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 50-51 (2006).   
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founding documents of the United States.
41
  Therefore, the 
more challenging position for many is why the inviolable 
values should be—or must be—informed by traditional 
Christian insights.
42
 
To that question, Ratzinger spells out a rationale 
that is more sophisticated than the one typically provided 
by advocates for Christian values.  The answer gleaned 
from the corpus of Ratzinger’s writings is that Christian 
values have their origin from the transcendent and, more 
specifically, from the Creator of humanity and the world.  
Therefore, these values necessarily are consistent with the 
meaning or intelligibility in creation and will thereby 
promote genuine human freedom.  This answer is grounded 
in a certain understanding of human freedom: an 
understanding of freedom that is readily distinguishable 
from the radical philosophy of freedom described at the 
outset of this section.  Whether to reconsider use of the 
                                                 
41
 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  
Ratzinger notes that de Tocqueville recognized that democracy in 
America was made possible by the precondition of a basic moral 
conviction.  See JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom, Law, and the Good, in 
VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 51 (2006).  Indeed, basic social 
contract doctrine is premised on the idea that the society consenting to 
government agrees on basic ideas about rights and liberties: otherwise, 
joining together and consenting to be governed and to be bound by 
laws of the society makes little sense.      
42
 For example, although Professor Steven Smith presents persuasive 
reasons why the modern concept of liberal neutrality is illusory and 
ineffective (indeed, deceptive), and, in-turn, argues for the need for a 
set of substantive beliefs and values upon which public decisions can 
be based (and also for a return to a proper understanding of toleration).  
He suggests that the content of the substantive values does not matter: 
“Legislatures and courts must make decisions, and decisions require 
choices among beliefs and values. . . . Thus, every regime must have its 
orthodoxy.  The orthodoxy might not constitute a cohesive ideology or 
theology, it might not be read into the official constitution, and it might 
vary from year to year or even, to some degree, from locale to locale.  
But a set of substantive beliefs and values . . . must exist.”  Smith, 
supra note 5, at 332 (emphasis added).    
20
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neutrality principle, then, ultimately rests on the extent to 
which this alternative view of freedom is deemed credible.   
As explained, a primary goal of this article is to 
provide a comprehensive yet comprehensible explanation 
of this alternate vision of human freedom through a 
synthesis of Ratzinger’s writings.43  Ratzinger’s work 
makes clear that this is a well-reasoned alternative view.  It 
grounds freedom in a vision of humanity; its history and 
destiny as understood in light of philosophical and 
theological scrutiny; and the development of God’s 
revelation to man.  It is a vision intimately bound up with 
belief in God.  But it is no more theologically based than 
neutrality itself and the radical philosophies of freedom, 
which are bound up with denial of the existence of God.   
   
II. A Christian View of Human Freedom 
 
Ratzinger’s comprehensive vision of human 
freedom can be understood only by studying a number of 
sources.  These sources include two documents issued by 
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: Instruction 
on Certain Aspects of the “Theology of Liberation,” issued 
August 6, 1984 (“ICATL”), and Instruction on Christian 
Freedom and Liberation, issued March 22, 1986 
(“ICFL”).44  It is useful to begin with an analysis of these 
                                                 
43
 Although this vision of freedom is absolutely central to 
understanding how to live out Christian faith, this author was unable to 
identify a good source providing a comprehensive and comprehensible 
explanation.  
44
 Ratzinger served as prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of 
Faith from 1981 until he was elected pope in 2005.  The 
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON 
CHRISTIAN FREEDOM AND LIBERATION (Mar. 22, 1986), 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc
_con_cfaith_doc_19860322_freedom-liberation_en.html [hereinafter 
ICFL] is the more comprehensive of the two documents.  But the 
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON 
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documents because they present the basic outline of the 
alternative vision of freedom—namely, the Christian 
understanding of freedom as liberation from sin and 
freedom to follow the commandments of God.  
In presenting this vision of human freedom, the two 
Instructions rely predominantly on the biblical witness to 
God’s historical encounters with humanity.45  The ICFL 
makes clear its reliance on revelation—and its approach to 
interpreting revelation—by noting at the outset that it is 
through the “mystery of the Incarnate Word and Redeemer 
of the world” that the Church “possesses the truth regarding 
the Father and his love for us, and also the truth concerning 
man and his freedom.”46  That is, it is only by revelation 
interpreted in light of Jesus Christ as the fullness of 
revelation that a proper conception of human freedom can 
be grasped.   
The ICFL points out that the yearning for freedom 
central to the modern era has its source in the Christian 
heritage, as captured by the witness of Holy Scripture in 
both the Old and New Testaments.
47
  The key liberating 
event testified to in the Old Testament is the Exodus: God’s 
                                                                                                 
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE “THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION” (Aug. 6, 1984), 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc
_con_cfaith_doc_19840806_theology-liberation_en.html [hereinafter 
ICATL] makes certain key points more directly and clearly.    
45
 Again, this is likely due to the Congregation for the Doctrine of 
Faith’s (“CDF”) primary concern with addressing liberation theologies, 
which tended to reverse the relationship between the Old and New 
Testaments.  See Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra note 24, at 
265 (noting that, in liberation theology, “baptism is [] understood on 
the basis of the exodus,” and “it is the symbol of a political process of 
liberation to which” the oppressed are called; and “Jesus is interpreted 
by reference back to Moses, while Moses is interpreted in anticipation 
by reference to Marx.”).  As explained by Ratzinger, the Instructions 
take the traditional path of seeking the internal logic of the basic pattern 
of biblical testimony to understand God, the world and man. Id. at 266.  
46
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #3.   
47
 Id. at #5. 
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action in rescuing his People from their bondage in Egypt, 
an event preceded by—and later re-enacted through—the 
paschal sacrifice and meal.
48
  The ICFL recognizes the 
Exodus as providing a model for freedom and liberation.  
The event, however, must be properly understood.  The 
ICFL thus explains that, in this event, freedom from 
economic, political and cultural slavery is attained, but it is 
attained part and parcel with God’s action in entering into a 
covenant with Israel.  Liberty is thus linked to communion 
or a relationship with God.
49
  
Further, as part of the covenant, God provides to 
Israel its Law, which included both the moral precepts of 
the Decalogue and religious and civil norms to govern the 
life of the people chosen by God to be his witness among 
the nations.
50
  Because the core of this collection of laws is 
love of God above all things and of neighbor as oneself, the 
pattern reflected by the Exodus event is freedom to live in a 
society “centered upon worship of the Lord and based upon 
justice and law inspired by love.”51  The ICFL also explains 
                                                 
48
 As clarified by Ratzinger in Freedom and Liberation, the fact of the 
exodus was possible “through a religious event, the sacrifice of the 
pasch, which is an anticipated core-element of the Torah.”  See 
Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra note 24, at 268. 
49
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #44. 
50
 Id. at #45. 
51
 Id. As explained by Ratzinger in Freedom and Liberation, the goal of 
exodus includes discovery of a law that “provides justice and thus 
builds up the right relationships of men and women between each other 
and with the whole of creation.” See Ratzinger, Freedom and 
Liberation, supra note 24, at 267.  “These relationships . . . depend 
however on the covenant, indeed they are the covenant; they cannot be 
devised and shaped by men and women alone, they depend on the 
fundamental relationship with regulates all other relationships, the 
relationship with God.” Id. at 267.  Indeed, “the really liberating 
element in the exodus is represented by the inauguration of the 
covenant between God and man, the covenant which is made actual in 
the Torah, that is in regulations of justice that are the shape of 
freedom.”  Id. at 268.   
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that the Psalms and the testimony of the Prophets suggest 
that injustice within this society occurs from transgressions 
of the law caused by “hardened hearts,” and that those 
suffering from injustice (the poor and the needy) learn to 
place their trust in the Lord: “the ‘poor of Yahweh’ know 
that communion with him is the most precious treasure and 
the one in which man finds his true freedom.”52   
Thus, as stated perhaps more directly in the 
previously issued ICATL, the Old Testament portrays 
salvation and healing from injustice as essentially a 
religious experience.  For example, whatever form 
suffering may take on the part of those who are faithful to 
the God of the Covenant (poverty, political oppression, 
hostility of enemies, injustice, failure, or death), it is from 
God alone that one can expect salvation and healing.
53
  
Further, freedom is linked to covenant with God and bound 
up with law and norms addressing relationships with God 
and others.  
  The witness provided by the New Testament 
clarifies this pattern of freedom.  As expressed in the ICFL: 
“The Exodus, the Covenant, the Law, the voices of the 
Prophets and the spirituality of the ‘poor of Yahweh’ only 
achieve their full significance in Christ.”54  It is by the 
power of the Paschal Mystery of Jesus Christ that humanity 
has been set free: “Through his perfect obedience on the 
Cross and through the glory of his Resurrection, the Lamb 
of God has taken away the sin of the world and opened for 
us the way to definitive liberation.”55   
More specifically, the ICFL explains that the 
Paschal Mystery enabled an outpouring of grace.  The heart 
of Christian freedom therefore lies in the action of grace, 
received through faith and the Church’s sacraments.  Grace 
                                                 
52
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #46-47. 
53
 ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. IV, #5.  
54
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #49. 
55
 Id. at #51. 
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frees humanity from sin and places humanity in 
communion with God.
56
  That is, through Christ’s Death 
and Resurrection, humanity is offered the opportunity to be 
reconciled with God, and the human experience of 
reconciliation is possible through the action of the Holy 
Spirit.
57
  The essence of the freedom attributable to grace 
and the work of the Holy Spirit is a capacity which sin had 
impaired—a capacity inherent within human beings to love 
God above all things and to remain in communion with 
him—a capacity that is constantly challenged or affected by 
the mystery of iniquity still at work in the world.
58
  As a 
consequence, Christian life is one of perseverance: human 
existence is a “spiritual struggle to live according to the 
Gospel and is waged with the weapons of God.”59   
Grace, thus, is the source of true freedom.
60
  And 
freedom itself is an enhancement or magnification of the 
capacity to love.  It is moving away from sin and being 
brought into a closer union with God.  It is the breaking 
down of barriers separating humanity from God.
61
  Again, 
the ICATL perhaps is more clear and direct: “Freedom is a 
new life in love.”62   
The Instructions therefore make clear that the Old 
and New Testaments are consistent in revealing that true 
                                                 
56
 Id. at #52. 
57
 Id.  
58
 Id. at #53. 
59
 Id. at #53 (citing Eph 6, 11-17). 
60
 Id. at #54. 
61
 Cf. id. at #52 (“In Christ, we can conquer sin, and death no longer 
separates us from God”); Id. at #53 (“For freedom Christ has set us 
free” (Gal 5:1).); Id. at #58 (“[P]ossessing the pledge of the Spirit, the 
People of God is led towards the fullness of freedom.  The new 
Jerusalem which we fervently await is rightly called the city of freedom 
in the highest sense.”); Id. at #63 (“Through the word of God and the 
Sacraments, man is freed in the first place from the power of sin and 
the power of the Evil One which oppress him; and he is brought into a 
communion of love with God”).   
62
 ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. IV, #2. 
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liberation depends on God’s action in helping humanity to 
avoid hardness of heart, to avoid transgression and sin, and 
thus to more fully conform with God’s law or command of 
love.
63
  God calls man to freedom,
64
 and genuine freedom 
is freedom from sin and being with God.  Communion with 
God is made possible through grace, and communion with 
God is linked in some way with how one lives.  Living in 
accordance with the Gospel brings man and society closer 
to God.  Rejecting God’s gift of grace results in pursing the 
inherent human need for the transcendent—the infinite—in 
finite things.  Worship of created things—rather than 
God—disrupts relationships and causes disorders that affect 
the sphere of family and society.
65
  Thus, liberation from 
sin is what will alleviate the evils, oppressions, and 
suffering in the world.   
 
V. The Deeper Philosophical & Theological 
Foundation for Human Freedom 
 
As noted, the ICFL explains that the Church 
possesses the truth concerning man and his freedom 
through the Mystery of Jesus Christ.  “From him, who is 
‘the way, the truth, and the life’ (Jn 14:6), the Church 
receives all that she has to offer mankind.”66  The ICATL 
similarly emphasizes that authentic human progress and 
liberation rests on three “indispensable pillars” of truth: the 
                                                 
63
 Notably, in light of revelation in Jesus Christ, the law of the Old 
Testament has been transformed: love is now a “response to the gift of 
love with which God draws near to us.”  Letter from Benedict XVI, 
Supreme Pontiff, to the Bishops, Priests, and Deacons; Men and 
Women Religious; and all the Lay Faithful on Christian Love,  (Dec. 
25, 2005) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents
/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.html, at #1. 
64
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #37. 
65
 Id. at #39. 
66
 Id. at #3. 
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truth about Jesus, the Savior from human sin; the truth 
about the Church; and the truth about man and his 
dignity.
67
  The documents explore most deeply the truth 
that genuine human liberation is salvific: it is freedom from 
sin.  
Yet, the overarching theme of the Instructions is 
that truth and freedom are inseparably linked, and that 
understanding human freedom also hinges on coming to 
understand the truth about man.  The ICFL states that, by 
revealing to man “his condition as a free person called to 
enter into communion with God,” the Gospel of Jesus 
Christ prompted an awareness of “hitherto unsuspected 
depths of human freedom.”68  Similarly, the ICATL notes 
that the radical philosophies of freedom which aim to 
create a new man through social control and social 
structures “leads to the denial of the meaning of the person 
and his transcendence” and, at the same time, destroys the 
foundation of ethics, namely, the absolute character of the 
distinction between good and evil.
69
  In both instances, the 
CDF is emphasizing the importance of properly 
understanding the meaning of the human person.  
Understanding the truth about man and the human person 
clarifies what sin is, which in turn clarifies what constitutes 
liberation.  
The Instructions, however, do not explore in any 
depth the concept of the human person or the truth about 
man.  The ICFL rejects the modern concept of the subject 
of freedom as “an individual who is fully self-sufficient and 
whose finality is the satisfaction of his own interests in the 
enjoyment of earthly goods.”70  It states that “every 
individual is oriented toward other people” and that 
genuine freedom exists only where “reciprocal bonds, 
                                                 
67
 ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. XI, #5. 
68
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #5. 
69
 ICATL, supra note 44, ch. IV, #15. 
70
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #13. 
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governed by truth and justice, link people to one another.”71  
It also states that “God did not create man as a ‘solitary 
being’ but wished him to be a ‘social being,’” and, thus, 
man “can only grow and realize his vocation in relation 
with others.”72  Sin, breaking away from God in acts of 
total autonomy and self-sufficiency, constitutes a denial of 
self.
73
  The freedom possible with the assistance of grace is 
a restored capacity to love God and remain in communion 
with him.
74
  Love of God, Christian love, takes the form of 
fraternal love.
75
  And, as stated in the ICATL, “[t]he 
recognition of the true relationship of human beings to God 
constitutes the foundation of justice to the extent that it 
rules the relationships between people.”76 
But what is the basis for these propositions?  In 
what way does the truth about man and his destiny or about 
the true relationship of human beings to God undermine 
ideas of autonomy and self-sufficiency or, on the contrary, 
support the idea that human aspirations for freedom hinge 
on relationships between people?  Again, it is by careful 
reflection on Jesus Christ as the fullness of revelation that 
truth emerges.  In other writings, Cardinal Ratzinger has 
tried to flesh out the truth about man emerging from 
philosophical and theological reflection on Jesus Christ.  
                                                 
71
 Id. at #26. 
72
 Id. at #32. 
73
 Id. at ##37-38. See also ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. IV, #12 (stating 
that sin “strikes man in the heart of his personality”). Sin, breaking 
away from God, disturbs man’s internal order and balance and the 
order and balance in society.  Sin also disrupts man’s aspiration to the 
infinite, and distorted attachment to finite created things leaves him 
“always searching for an impossible peace.”  ICFL, supra note 44, at 
#40. 
74
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #53. 
75
 Id. at ##56-57.  Fraternal love encompasses the “direct and 
imperative requirement of respect for all human beings in their rights to 
life and to dignity.”  Id.   
76
 ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. XI, #6. See also ICFL, supra note 44, at 
#60. 
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The short answer is that the Christian perspective of human 
freedom is fully supported when it is understood that man 
is made in God’s image precisely insofar as being “from,” 
“with,” and “for” constitutes the fundamental 
anthropological pattern.  It is this pattern that constitutes 
the essence of the human person.  Moreover, human 
freedom is a collective endeavor and attaining freedom 
depends on following the way opened up by Jesus Christ.  
The cornerstone supporting these basic principles is the 
idea of a personal God. 
 
A.  Freedom Grounded in a Logos that is Love 
 
A comprehensive vision of Christian freedom is 
more understandable and compelling when viewed within 
the bigger picture of the existence of “being” in the world.   
Explaining how Christianity in general fits into the larger 
philosophical realm was part of Ratzinger’s objective in his 
book Introduction to Christianity.  In this book, Ratzinger 
was not addressing freedom specifically, but, nonetheless, 
made many points in the book that are relevant to 
understanding the Christian vision of human freedom.  
Ratzinger explains that, when considering the existence of 
being in the world, the overarching question is: “In all the 
variety of individual things, what is, so to speak, the 
common stuff of being – what is the one being behind the 
many ‘things’, which nevertheless all ‘exist.’”77    He notes 
that the endless variety of philosophies attempting to think 
out “being” can, broadly speaking, be reduced to two basic 
possibilities: the materialist solution or the idealistic 
solution.  He then explains Christianity’s tie to the idealistic 
solution.   
                                                 
77
 JOSEPH RATZINGER, INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIANITY 156 (J.R. 
Foster trans., Ignatius Press 2d ed. 2004) (1968) [hereinafter Ratzinger, 
Introduction]. 
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The materialistic solution sees everything 
encountered in the world as mere matter.  Matter is the only 
thing that “always remains as demonstrable reality and, 
consequently, represents the real being of all that exists.”78   
Matter is the raw tangible stuff that constitutes or 
comprises things and beings in the world.  From a 
philosophical perspective, matter is a being that does not 
comprehend being in that it “‘is’ but does not understand 
itself.”79  Thus, if matter is the being of all that exists, the 
logical implication is that any capacity to “understand 
being” that may exist in the cosmos arises only as a 
secondary, chance product during the course of 
development.
80
  Therefore, the fact that human beings can 
understand things, or find meaning in things, is a mere 
accident.  Materialism, then, accords primacy to the 
irrational.
81
 
Christianity rejects the materialist solution in favor 
of a modified idealistic solution.
82
  The idealistic solution 
                                                 
78
 Id. at 156. 
79
 Id. 
80
 Id.  
81
 Ratzinger had highlighted this important point in a number of 
writings.  See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS 
OF CULTURES 49 (2006) (noting that whether the world comes from an 
irrational source is a fundamental issue: “A reason that has its origin in 
the irrational and is itself ultimately irrational does not offer a solution 
to our problems.  Only that creative reason which has manifested itself 
as love in the crucified God can truly show us what life is.”).   
82
 Ratzinger has explained that all great cultures have recognized the 
idealistic solution, namely, the doctrine of objective values expressed in 
the Being of the world, and the conviction that man’s Being contains an 
imperative; he does not invent morality on the basis of expediency but 
rather finds it already present in the essence of things.  He notes that 
this common insight presents itself as the primal evidential character of 
human life, and that modern thinkers drew the “simple conclusion” that 
moralities of mankind constitute but human constructions.  To 
Ratzinger, “this diagnosis is extremely superficial. . . .”  See JOSEPH 
RATZINGER, Faith’s Answer to the Crisis of Values, IN A TURNING 
POINT FOR EUROPE: THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD: 
30
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posits that the scrutiny of things in the cosmos shows that 
things and beings are “being-thought.”   That is, all being is 
a product of thought.  Thinking is prior to matter, and, 
specifically, thinking by a subjective mind.
83
  In non-
Christian versions of idealism, all being is the being-
thought of one single consciousness, and all being is 
unified in the identity of the one consciousness.  Any 
appearance of independence proves to be mere 
appearance.
84
  The Christian understanding is different 
because the thinking being whose thought produces is not 
just thought or Eternal Reason but, rather, the being is also 
Love.   
The person of Jesus brought this point to light in a 
powerful way.  But there was an understanding that existed 
before Christ as a result of God’s encounters with Israel 
that revealed him as a personal God.  As Ratzinger 
explains, the shema of Israel—“Hear, O Israel. He is our 
God.  He is One.”—is the real core of the believer’s 
                                                                                                 
ASSESSMENT AND FORECAST, supra note 11, at 35-36.  Ratzinger has 
also explained that belief in Creation is reasonable, and, further, that 
“even from the perspective of the data of the natural sciences it is the 
‘better hypothesis,’ offering a fuller and better explanation than any of 
the other theories.”  See Joseph Ratzinger, God the Creator, in IN THE 
BEGINNING. . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF THE 
CREATION AND THE FALL 17 (Boniface Ramsey trans., Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Pub. Co. 1995) (1986) [hereinafter Ratzinger, God the 
Creator].  In the second homily Ratzinger explains that the scientific-
based theories hinge on the entire ensemble of nature arising out of 
errors and dissonances and that some scientists acknowledge the 
absurdness of the theories, but, nonetheless, cannot break out of the 
scientific mindset because “the scientific method demands that a 
question not be permitted to which the answer would have to be God.”  
JOSEPH RATZINGER, The Meaning of the Biblical Creation Accounts, in 
IN THE BEGINNING. . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF 
THE CREATION AND THE FALL, supra, at 22-25 [hereinafter Ratzinger, 
The Meaning]. 
83
 Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 156-57. 
84
 Id. at 157. 
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identity and is grounded in the fact that God loves and 
wants a relationship with his creation. 
 
The believing Jew dies 
reciting this profession; the 
Jewish martyrs breathed their 
last declaring it and gave their 
lives for it. . . .  The fact that 
this God now shows us his 
face in Jesus Christ (Jn 14:9) – 
a face that Moses was not 
allowed to see (Ex 33:20) – 
does not alter this profession 
in the least and changes 
nothing essential in this 
identity.  Of course, the fact 
that God is personal is not 
mentioned in the Bible using 
that term, but it is apparent 
nevertheless, inasmuch as 
there is a name of God.  A 
name implies the ability to be 
called on, to speak, to hear, to 
answer.  This is essential for 
the biblical God, and if this is 
taken away, the faith of the 
Bible has been abandoned. . . .  
But what is actually meant, 
then, by God’s name, by his 
being personal?  Precisely 
this: Not only can we 
experience him, beyond all 
[earthly] experience, but also 
32
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he can express and 
communicate himself.
85
   
 
God has revealed to humanity that he wants to 
communicate with humans.  He has communicated himself 
to humanity in history because he desires a relationship 
with humanity.  And he has welcomed prayer from 
humans.
86
  God’s desire and the nature of the relationship is 
revealed most fully through Jesus Christ, but Scripture 
reveals that God has been in relationship with humanity 
since the dawn of creation.  The first step in understanding 
human freedom as communal with God—involving a 
reality internal to the human being, or a capacity to be in 
union with God, involves considering the issue from the 
perspective of Christian idealism—namely, the 
understanding of God as Reason and Love. 
Ratzinger has stressed in many forums the 
importance of the decision by the early Christians to 
explicitly recognize that the God of the philosophers—the 
Logos, the divine presence that can be perceived by the 
rational analysis of reality—is one and the same as the 
                                                 
85
 Id. at 22-23 (preface to the 2000 edition). 
86
 In Spe Salvi, Pope Benedict XVI explains that outside Christianity, a 
God to whom one could pray did not exist, and that the idea of a 
personal God radically changed the prevailing world-view that, in a 
different way, is prominent today.  “It is not the elemental spirits of the 
universe, the laws of matter, which ultimately govern the world and 
mankind, but a personal God governs the stars, that is, the universe; it 
is not the laws of matter and of evolution that have the final say, but 
reason, will, love – a Person.  And if we know this Person and he 
knows us, then truly the inexorable power of material elements no 
longer has the last word; we are not slaves of the universe and its laws, 
we are free.”  Letter from Benedict XVI, Supreme Pontiff, to Bishops, 
Priests, and Deacons; Men and Women Religious; and all the Lay 
Faithful on Christian Love (Nov., 30 2007) (on file with author), 
available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents
/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20071130_spe-salvi_en.html, at #5.   
33
Jordan: A Christian Vision of Freedom and Democracy: Neutrality as an Obs
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2014
Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3 
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 391 
 
personal God who has entered history.
87
  To Christians, the 
Logos is not just Eternal Reason.  It is not an anonymous, 
neutral consciousness.  The Christian God is not simply a 
“first cause.”  Rather, in Christianity the Logos loves.  The 
Logos is Love.
88
   
A Logos that is Love fundamentally alters idealism.  
The consciousness that is the ultimate being is not a mere 
craftsman, but rather, is creative mind.
89
  Indeed, Eternal 
Reason is creative because it is Love.  Freedom is also a 
consequence of Love.  In creating or thinking, the Logos 
that is Love gives freedom to its creation.  As explained by 
Ratzinger, the creative consciousness that is Love releases 
what has been thought into the freedom of its own, 
independent existence.  Being-thought of the Logos that is 
Love has more than a mere appearance of being: being-
thought is true being itself.
90
    
In Introduction to Christianity, Ratzinger 
highlighted several key implications flowing from this 
understanding of Logos as creating and loving that are 
relevant to understanding freedom.  First, each human 
being is not merely an individual “reproduction” or 
secondary thing—the result of idea being diffused into 
matter.  Rather, each human being is a definite being, a true 
being, unique and unrepeatable.  “The highest is not the 
                                                 
87
 Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 138. 
88
 Ratzinger gives an extensive treatment to the concept that God is 
Love. See Letter from Benedict XVI, Supreme Pontiff, to the Bishops, 
Priests, and Deacons; Men and Women Religious; and all the Lay 
Faithful on Christian Love,  (Dec. 25, 2005) (on file with author), 
available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents
/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.html, at #1.. 
89
 Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 157.  Ratzinger has noted 
that the revelation that existence is Creation was itself a decisive 
moment of Enlightenment.  See Ratzinger, God the Creator, supra note 
82, at 14.    
90
 Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 157. 
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most universal but, precisely, the particular, and the 
Christian faith is thus above all also the option for man as 
the irreducible, infinity-oriented being.”91  Each human 
being exists because of being thought by God and, thus, is 
known by and loved by God. 
Second, the existence of any being created by the 
Logos that is Love is, essentially, freedom.  Therefore, 
freedom is the structural form of all being.
92
  Stated another 
way, it can be said that life itself is freedom.  This has 
positive and negative aspects.  Because freedom is the 
structure of creation, incomprehensibility is part and parcel 
of the cosmos.  The world cannot be reduced to 
mathematics, and the mystery of the demonic exists: “As 
the arena of love [the world] is also the playground of 
freedom and also incurs the risk of evil.”  But the mystery 
of darkness can be seen as an acceptable tradeoff for the 
greater positives of freedom and love.
93
  Each human being 
is a distinct being set free by God because of God’s love. 
Third, all being is intelligible and meaningful 
because pure intellect made it and He made it by thinking 
it.  The intelligibility in things, in being-thought that is true 
being, is the expression of creative pre-mediation.  Human 
thinking, then, is “re-thinking,” and it is right or true when 
it is in conformity with the thought of the Creator.
94
  As 
explained by Ratzinger:  “Man can rethink the logos, the 
meaning of being, because his own logos, his own reason, 
is logos of the one logos, thought of the original thought, of 
the creative spirit that permeates and governs his being.”95   
This means that the conception of man and the way man 
                                                 
91
 Id. at 158.  The Supreme Being can care for humans precisely 
because His consciousness does not have limits – He can embrace the 
whole.  Id. at 146.  From this perspective, love is higher than thought.  
Id. at 147.  
92
 Id. at 157.     
93
 Id. at 159-60.   
94
 Id. at 59. 
95
 Id. 
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should live is correct and true when in conformity with 
God’s idea of man.  Knowing what it means to be human 
means coming to know the “Idea” of the Creative being.   
If Eternal Reason and Creative Love are one and the 
same, the measure of human action is Truth.  This was the 
message of Jesus:  "The truth will make you free" (Jn 8:32).  
But humanity can only know the Truth with God’s help and 
Truth that comes from God has its center in Jesus Christ.
96
  
This is the real essence of Christian faith.  Faith is the 
encounter with Jesus.  Faith is the Word coming from the 
transcendent.  Faith is reception of what cannot be thought 
out.
97
  In God’s encounters with mankind throughout 
history, God is seeking a relationship that hinges on 
mankind understanding God’s Idea for humanity.  Creation 
and Covenant go hand in hand.
98
  Jesus Christ is the key to 
understanding God’s Idea for humanity.  Jesus Christ is 
essential to human freedom because he brought knowledge 
and understanding—the fullness of revelation—to assist 
human reasoning.  But this is not all.  It is his presence and 
                                                 
96
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #3. 
97
 See JOSEPH RATZINGER, The Ecclesiology of the Second Vatican 
Council, in CHURCH, ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN 
ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 3, 10 (“Faith is the encounter with 
what I cannot think up myself or bring about by my own efforts but 
what must come to encounter me”); Ratzinger, Luther, supra note 21, 
at 126-27 (Christian faith is sharing in knowledge with Jesus Christ). 
98
 To Ratzinger, this point is crucial.  Materialism, as it shows up in its 
many philosophical forms, rejects creation because it implies a 
dependence that deprives the world its power and that ultimately is 
perceived as the real barrier to freedom; it will not entrust itself to a 
world already created, but only to world still to be created.  The 
Christian option is the opposite.  Human beings are dependent.  But it 
is a dependence that takes the form of love and, thus, does not involve 
diminishment of self, but, rather, leads to freedom.  See JOSEPH 
RATZINGER, The Consequences of Faith in Creation, in “In the 
Beginning. . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF 
CREATION AND THE FALL, supra note 82, at 98-100. 
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the presence of the Holy Spirit that enable human union 
with God.   
 
B.  Trinitarian Insights into Freedom  
 
The Christian vision of freedom as explained by 
Ratzinger partially rests on the principle that “man is God’s 
image precisely insofar as being ‘from,’ ‘with,’ and ‘for’ 
constitute the fundamental anthropological pattern.”99  It is 
this pattern that constitutes the essence of the human 
person.   Ratzinger’s understanding of this pattern rests on 
the concept of the human person as revealed by Jesus 
Christ and, more specifically, by knowledge of God as “one 
being in three persons” and knowledge of Jesus Christ as 
having “two natures and one person.”  Therefore, it is a 
concept with meaning because of the Christian doctrine of 
the Trinity.   
 
1)  The Concept of Person 
  
The concept of person that emerged from the 
development of the doctrine of the Trinity, and the process 
of developing the concept, were explored by Ratzinger in 
Retrieving the Tradition: Concerning the Notion of Person 
in Theology, published in 1990.
100
  In this article, Ratzinger 
points out that early Christian philosophers latched onto a 
philosophically insignificant concept—the literary use of 
dialogue or roles, persona, to depict the action occurring in 
dramatic events—and transformed the concept in a radical 
way.  “The ‘role’ truly exists; it is . . . the face, the person 
                                                 
99
 Ratzinger highlighted this point.  See Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, 
supra note 26, at 346-47.   
100
 Joseph Ratzinger, Retrieving the Tradition: Concerning the Notion 
of Person in Theology, 17 COMMUNIO 439 (1990) [hereinafter 
Ratzinger, Retrieving the Tradition]. 
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of the Logos.”101  Jesus’s words and actions support the 
concept of the Trinity, but what helps make the concept of 
the Trinity comprehensible?  The early Christian 
philosophers used the transformed concept of persona to 
help explain the reality of the intra-divine dialogue found 
throughout Scripture and the ontological reality of being 
emphasized by St. John in writing his Gospel. 
Foremost, the concept of “person” was understood 
as a dialogical reality whose essence is action.  But what is 
the nature of this reality?
102
  To the early Christian 
philosophers, the nature of reality fell into one of two 
categories: substance (the sustaining form or real essence of 
a thing) or matter with its accidents (the chance 
circumstances of being).  God is wholly spirit with no 
accidents.  The crux of the question, then, was whether the 
persons of God were substance.  The philosophers knew 
this could not be the case since the essence of God’s being 
                                                 
101
 Id. at 439, 442.  In interpreting poems or narratives, ancient literary 
scholars would uncover the prosopon or persona used by the author.  In 
studying Scripture, Christian philosophers noticed a similar use of 
dialogue in that God speaks to himself and God speaks through the 
Prophets.  The philosophers spoke in terms of the “sacred writers” 
introducing “different prosopa, different roles,” but the Christian 
philosophers recognized a radical difference: “The roles introduced by 
the sacred writer are realities, they are dialogical realities.” Id. at 441. 
102
 The question whether the three persons were in fact realities was, 
itself, a challenging philosophical and theological question.  Therefore, 
does the “triplicity” genuinely inform humanity about what God is like 
in himself or only about how man can relate to God or the mode in 
which God relates to man?  The Church settled on the understanding 
that “God is as he shows himself; God does not show himself in a way 
in which he is not.”  Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 165 
(emphasis in original).  Or, as explained by Ratzinger, “[a]lthough it is 
true that we only know God as he is reflected in human thought, the 
Christian faith held firmly to the view that in this reflection it is him 
that we know.  Even if we are not capable of breaking out of the narrow 
bounds of our consciousness, God can nevertheless break into this 
consciousness and show himself in it.” Id. at 167 (emphasis in 
original). 
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is oneness.  Scripture also made clear the idea of “relation” 
between the persons of God: the Father and the Son.  
Philosophy traditionally considered “relation” an aspect of 
accidents, or a characteristic of matter (a thing is between, 
beside, above, etc.), as opposed to form.  The logical 
solution was thus to conceive of relation differently: as a 
reality within being and distinct from substance and 
accident.  Person is relation.  Relation is the person, and the 
person exists only as relation.  Father, Son, and the Holy 
Spirit are real existing relations, and nothing besides.
103
  
Further, they are pure act.  The idea that the Father begets 
the Son means that the Father is self-donation: pure reality 
of act, pure act-being.
104
  In Ratzinger’s words, “[i]n God, 
person is the pure relativity of being turned toward the 
other; . . . [it lies] on the level of dialogical reality, of 
relativity toward other.”105   
Ratzinger recognizes the interplay between 
philosophy and theology that led to this original concept of 
person as pure relativity toward others.  But he also 
emphasizes that Scripture confirms and deepens this 
understanding.   He explains that statements such as “The 
Son cannot do anything of himself” (John 5:19) or “I and 
the Father are one” (John 10:30) mean that Jesus “has 
nothing of himself alone,” that he “does not place himself 
as a delimited substance next to the Father;” and that Jesus 
“constitutes nothing but relativity toward [the Father] that 
                                                 
103
 Ratzinger, Retrieving the Tradition, supra note 100 at 444. 
104
 Id. at 444. 
105
 Id.  Ratzinger emphasizes the novelty and value of this Christian 
contribution to human thought: “Again we encounter the Christian 
newness of the personalistic idea in all its sharpness and clarity.  The 
contribution offered by faith to human thought becomes especially 
clear and palpable here.  It was faith that gave birth to this idea of pure 
act, of pure relativity, which does not lie on the level of substance and 
does not touch or divide substance; and it was faith that thereby 
brought the personal phenomenon into view.” Id. at 445 (emphasis in 
original). 
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does not delimit a precinct of what is merely and properly 
its own.”106  Ratzinger also sees other Scriptural themes as 
reinforcing the idea of person or relation as encompassing 
“openness,” specifically, the theology of mission and the 
doctrine of the Logos.  In both the Old and New 
Testaments, the emissary is one with the sender.  Christ is 
the genuine emissary who is in his entire nature “the one 
sent.”  As “the one sent” Jesus stands in complete relativity 
of existence towards the one who sent him.  Thus, the 
“content of Jesus’ existence is ‘being from someone and 
toward someone,’ the absolute openness of existence 
without any reservation of what is merely and properly 
one’s own.”107  The doctrine of the Logos is consistent.  
The term Logos has rich significance in terms of eternal 
rationality.  But, in addition, Ratzinger points out that the 
Logos, as Word, “is essentially from someone else and 
toward someone else; word is existence that is completely 
path and openness.”108 
Moreover, Ratzinger points out that Scripture itself 
suggests that this idea of person should be transferred to 
humans.  Jesus tells his disciples that “Without me you can 
do nothing” (John 15:5), and prays that “they may be one 
as we are one” (John 17:11).109  The idea of emissary, 
similarly, is transferred to the disciples when Jesus states, 
“As the Father has sent me, so I am sending you” (John 
20:21).   Ratzinger thus notes: 
                                                 
106
 Id. at 445. 
107
 Id. at 446. 
108
 Id. 
109
 Ratzinger thus notes: “It is thus part of the existence even of the 
disciples that man does not posit the reservation of what is merely and 
properly his own, does not strive to form the substance of the closed 
self, but enters into pure relativity toward the other and toward God.  It 
is in this way that he truly come to himself and into the fullness of his 
own, because he enters into unity with the one to whom he is related.” 
Id. at 445. 
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I believe a profound 
illumination of God as well as 
man occurs here, the decisive 
illumination of what person 
must mean in terms of 
Scripture: not a substance that 
closes itself in itself, but the 
phenomenon of complete 
relativity, which is, of course, 
realized in its entirety only in 
the one who is God, but which 
indicates the direction of all 
personal being.”110   
 
Theological and philosophical reflection on the knowledge 
of God as the Trinity, as three persons in one being, thus 
provides a solid foundation for the idea that “relativity, 
being turned toward other” is a distinct aspect of the human 
person and thus of human existence.   
In Retrieving the Tradition, Ratzinger also discusses 
how reflection on knowledge of Christ reinforces this 
vision of the human person.  In trying to grasp the meaning 
of Christ, theologians again focused on the word persona.  
The formula is as follows:  Christ has two natures—a 
divine and human nature—but only one divine person.  
Ratzinger notes that, as to the meaning of “person” 
reflected in this formula, the early theologians worked out 
what the person is not, but did not clarify with the same 
precision what the concept means positively.  In the many 
battles over the question of “who and what is this Christ,” it 
was clarified that the formula and its use of the phrase 
“divine person” does not in any way indicate that anything 
was lacking in the humanity of Christ.
111
  Therefore, the 
phrase “divine person” cannot be thought of as indicating 
                                                 
110
 Id. (emphasis in original). 
111
 Id. at 448. 
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that the reality of person, the reality of relativity, does not 
reach Jesus’s humanity.  Rather, the concept of person is an 
essential aspect of the entire existence of Jesus, his divinity 
and humanity.  Beyond this, however, Ratzinger only 
identifies “hints that point out the direction” for 
Christological and, in turn, anthropological reflection.  Yet 
these hints are powerful and well grounded. 
Ratzinger points out that Boethius’s concept of 
person, which prevailed in Western philosophy as “the 
individual substance of a rational nature,” is erroneous and 
unhelpful in the context of the Trinity and Christology 
because it puts the idea of “person” on the level of 
substance.
112
  Reflection on God as three persons has 
placed “person” in an arena of being distinct from both 
substance and accident or matter.  Further, person is an 
aspect of the spirit, and in Jesus, would be an aspect of his 
divinity and humanity.  In humanity, this spirit is 
embodied. 
Ratzinger then engages in philosophical reflection 
on the nature of spirit to make a key point about the human 
person.  First, in contrast to matter that “is what is,” the 
spirit is that “which is not only there, but is itself in 
transcending itself, in looking toward the other and in 
looking back upon itself.”113  Because openness—
relatedness to the whole—is thus the essence of spirit, it is 
in reaching beyond itself, by being with other, that spirit 
comes to itself.  Second, spirit is that being which is able to 
think about itself, about being in general, and about the 
wholly other, namely, the transcendent God.  Indeed, 
Ratzinger points out that the ability to reflect on the 
concept of God is the mark that truly distinguishes the 
                                                 
112
 Id. at 448.  (In other contexts, Boethius’s concept can provide a 
springboard for reflection about the concept of person.  See, e.g.,  John 
Paul II’s work on the acting-person.) 
113
 Id. at 451 (quoting HEDWIG CONRAD-MARTIUS, DAS SEIN 133 ( 
1957)). 
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human spirit from other forms of consciousness found in 
animals.
114
  Third, the other through which the spirit 
ultimately comes to itself must be God.  He concludes that 
if the person is itself the more it is with the other, “then the 
person is all the more itself the more it is with the wholly 
other, with God.”115  Or, stated another way:  the “human 
person is the event or being of relativity” and the “more the 
person’s relativity aims totally and directly at its final goal, 
at transcendence, the more the person is itself.”116 
Integrating this point with knowledge of Christ, 
Ratzinger sees two main ideas emerge.  In Christ, “being 
with other” is radically realized.  Relativity toward other is 
always the foundation of his consciousness and existence.  
But this does not cancel out the “being with” that is 
inherent to his human nature.  “In Christ, in the man who is 
completely with God, human existence is not canceled, but 
comes to its highest possibility, which consists in 
transcending itself into the absolute and in the integration 
of its own relativity into the absoluteness of divine love.”117  
Ratzinger’s first point is that this implies that the human 
person in history is “being on the way” towards integration 
into divine love.
118
   
His second point flows from the fact that knowledge 
of Christ “adds the idea of ‘we’ to the idea of ‘I’ and 
‘you.’”  Ratzinger notes that Scripture depicts Christ as the 
“all-encompassing space in which the ‘we’ of human 
beings gathers on the way to the Father.”119  Therefore, 
Christ, the one divine person, is the “we” into which Love, 
the Holy Spirit, gathers humanity.  Similarly, Scripture 
                                                 
114
 Id. at 451. 
115
 Id. at 451-52. 
116
 Id. 
117
 Id. 
118
 Id.  Ratzinger does not emphasize the point in this article, but this 
fact is also the reason why, or the mechanism through which, the 
persons of collective humanity are able to integrate with God.   
119
 Id. at 452-53. 
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shows God as the “we” of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.  
Thus, the dialogical principle in Christianity is not simply 
an “I-Thou” relationship.  Rather, on both sides of the 
dialogue, the “I” is integrated into the greater “we.”120  
Thus, the true character of dialogue with the Father—
integration of the human relativity with Divine Love—is 
properly reflected in the liturgical formula “through Christ 
in the Holy Spirit to the Father.”121  To Ratzinger, this 
proper understanding of the human person’s relationship 
with God totally undermines a Christian view that 
emphasizes only an individualized relationship with 
God.
122
  Individuals should strive for a deep and personally 
heartfelt relationship with God, but each person’s 
relationship with God is necessarily intertwined with and 
part of God’s relationship with humanity as a whole. 
 
2) Freedom as Transcendence towards 
Other 
 
Understanding the concept of the human person, 
and integrating it with the cornerstone idea of a personal 
God, clarifies the following:  The human being is a unity, a 
spirit-in-body.  An essential aspect of this unity is an 
existential component:  a reality encompassed by the term 
person, a component that is pure relativity that knows of 
God and is striving for integration with or union with God.  
                                                 
120
 Id. at 453. 
121
 Id.  
122
 He also notes that the typical individualized “I”–“You” perspective 
contributed to the eventual loss of the “You.” Id. at 453 (noting that in 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy the “you” is no longer found).  At the 
same time, Ratzinger acknowledges that this collective vision of 
integration or union with God was obscured by the manner in which 
both Augustine and Thomas Aquinas presented certain aspects of the 
Trinity. Id. at 454. See also id. at 449.  But, the existential approach had 
been introduced by the beginning of the Middle Ages by Richard of St. 
Victor.  See id. at 449. 
44
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 9, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 4
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol9/iss4/4
Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3 
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 402 
 
This existential component is integral to each human being 
by virtue of being a creature of a personal God, a Logos 
that is Love, and a God whose essence of oneness includes 
a dialogical reality that is pure relativity of being turned 
toward other.  Indeed, for a Logos that is Love—a personal 
God—this reality that is pure relativity necessarily exists.  
It is the essence of Love.  And it is this Love that is an 
integral part of each human being and an inherent aspect of 
human nature.
123
  It is this Love that is the person and the 
relativity of each human.  The love or relativity within each 
human being is completed only by re-union with God.  
Union or integration occurs on the level or plane of 
relation, or Love, and union with God depends on thinking 
and acting with God.  Union or integration of this love in 
each human being with Divine Love is possible in and 
through Jesus Christ and, thus, occurs collectively with 
other human beings.    
These insights into the essence of the concept of 
person clarify the nature of sin and thus why genuine 
liberation is freedom from sin.  Man does not come to 
himself through autonomy and self-sufficiency.  Rather, the 
human person strives towards transcendence.  “It is in this 
way that he truly comes to himself and into the fullness of 
his own, because he enters into unity with the one to whom 
he is related.”124  This involves turning toward others.  The 
fundamental figure of human existence thus is a being 
“from,” “with,” and “for,” and sin thus consists in human 
                                                 
123
 The magisterium uses the phrase “nature of a being” to refer to what 
constitutes the being as such, with the dynamism of its tendencies 
toward its proper ends; “It is from God that natures possess what they 
are, as well as their proper ends.”  Beings are created and “impregnated 
with a significance in which man, as the image of God, is capable of 
discerning the creating hand of God.”  INTERNATIONAL THEOLOGICAL 
COMMISSION, FAITH AND INCULTURATION ch. I, #1 (1988), available 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents
/rc_cti_1988_fede-inculturazione_en.html (internal quotations omitted) 
124
 Ratzinger, Retrieving the Tradition, supra note 100, at 445. 
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actions that interfere with this pattern and with union with 
God.  Further, because the person is more himself or herself 
the more the person’s relativity aims totally and directly at 
its final goal and at transcendence, freedom necessarily 
consists in liberation from sin.   
 
C. The Incarnation: Freedom as Fulfillment of 
the Divine Idea   
 
The revelation brought by Jesus Christ opened a 
whole new dimension to humanity’s knowledge of God 
and, in turn, humanity’s knowledge of man.  While this 
article has discussed much of that insight bearing on human 
freedom, Ratzinger’s writing fleshes out an even deeper 
dimension of human freedom.  A dimension grounded in 
the unity of humanity and relating to how Jesus Christ 
enables human union with God.  This perspective of human 
freedom only comes to light with the fullness of the 
message of Christ.  A fullness that is still unfolding but that 
was rendered substantially comprehensible in the first 
several centuries of Christianity by Christian philosophers 
working with the Church and from within the faith. 
In working out the implications of the doctrine of 
the Trinity, along with the implications of understanding 
the Logos as Love, the meaning of liberation from sin 
began to come to light.  Jesus brought liberation from sin.  
It is in Christ that humanity has been set free.  Freedom is 
thinking and acting with God, such that union with God 
occurs on the level or plane of relation, or Love.  But, the 
question arises:  How, more specifically, does Jesus enable 
humanity to achieve God’s objective?  Ratzinger has 
addressed this more particular aspect of the Mystery of the 
Incarnation and the Trinity. 
As explained, the doctrine of the Trinity posits God 
as three Persons in One Being.  Each Person is a reality or 
an act of relativity.  God is Father only in relation to his 
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Son, only in “being for” the other.  He is the act of giving 
himself.  Similarly, Christ is Son only in relation to Father.  
He has nothing of his own and can do nothing on his own.  
He stands in the Father and constantly is one with him.  
Son is “being from” another.  But since he also is one with 
the Father, he is a “being for.”  The Son is being “for 
others.”  This is the essence of the revelation of Jesus’s life 
and work:  the whole being of Jesus is a function of the “for 
us.”125  Jesus is thus absolute openness of existence, from 
and for.  This existence is a complete path and openness.  
The Holy Spirit is God facing outward, the means through 
which Jesus Christ—in all his openness and breadth and 
freedom—remains present in the history of the world.126  
The Holy Spirit is the gift of Love and the constituting 
principle of the new man in Christ.
127
   
Ratzinger notes in Introduction to Christianity that, 
in addition to other radical insights, the triple relativity of 
these Persons in the one Being of God brought about a 
profound break-through relating to unity and plurality in 
                                                 
125
 Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 204.  Indeed, Christians 
understand that it is only “to him who died on the Cross, to him who 
renounced all earthly power . . . to him who laid aside the sword and . . 
. went to his death for others, to him who saw the meaning of human 
existence, not in power and self-assertion, but in existing utterly for 
others – who indeed was, as the Cross shows, existence for others – to 
him and him alone God has said “You are my son, today I have 
begotten you.” Id. at 219.  Love of God and neighbor, which devolves 
to service to others is, of course, the crux of the Jesus’s teaching.  But, 
what is important is not that Jesus left behind a body of teaching.  What 
is important is that Jesus is his teaching. Id. at 205, 226.  As explained 
by Ratzinger, “his being itself is service” and for this reason “it is 
sonship.” Id. at 226.  
126
 Id. at 332-34. 
127
 Id. at 337.  The Holy Spirit is “God’s gift to history in the 
community of those who believe in Christ,” id. at 331, a gift accessible 
largely through baptism, penance, and the Eucharist.  Id. at 336.  The 
center of the Spirit’s activity in the world is thus the Church.  Id. at  
335. 
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the philosophy of being.  To ancient thought, only unity or 
oneness could be divine, and plurality was conceived as a 
disintegration of divine.
128
  However, if the highest Being 
no longer is understood as a detached Being, existing 
closed in on himself in his oneness, divinity is not mere 
unity.  Plurality too has its inner ground in God.  “Plurality 
is not just disintegration that sets in outside the divinity. . . . 
it is not the result of the dualism of two opposing powers; it 
corresponds to the creative fullness of God, who himself 
stands above plurality and unity, encompassing both.”129  
Ratzinger explains that the “multi-unity that grows in love 
is a more radical, truer unity than the unity of the 
‘atom.’”130  Thus, the “three persons” who exist in God do 
not impair the unity or oneness of God but, rather, fills-out 
that oneness.
131
 
  The idea that plurality can enhance unity makes 
comprehensible the idea of collective freedom in and 
through Jesus.  Notably, Ratzinger explains in Introduction 
to Christianity that this fuller message of Christian 
liberation from sin has been obscured in recent centuries 
due to an emphasis on “theologies of the cross” and St. 
Anselm’s “satisfaction theory.”132   While these theories 
have elements of truth, Ratzinger argues that a truer picture 
exists.  This picture rests more heavily on a theology of the 
Incarnation and the Logos as Love.  As explained, the 
Logos that is Love creates being that can understand itself 
and desires.  That being does understand itself and that it 
thereby comes to itself.  The Incarnation is essential to this 
objective.  For humanity, the Incarnation was a crucial step 
in the process of coming to know itself.  Further, for the 
                                                 
128
 Id. at 178. 
129
 Id. at 179. 
130
 Id. 
131
 “[P]ure oneness can only occur in the spirit and embraces the 
relatedness of love.”  Id. at 188. 
132
 Id. at 231-32. 
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Logos that is Love, the Incarnation simply is part and 
parcel of the divine Idea “man.”    
The doctrine of the Incarnation focuses on the fact 
of God’s assuming human nature: the fact that the Word 
became flesh.  Although this paper has not yet focused on 
it, one other important aspect of the philosophical and 
theological debates concerning the doctrine of the Trinity is 
the key question whether Jesus was both fully divine and 
fully human.  In fact, the issue is the most fundamental one 
because if Jesus was not fully divine and fully human, there 
would be no need to delve into the issue of what it means 
that there exist “three Persons in one Being.”  Despite the 
many theories proffered with other answers, however, 
Christian philosophers working with the Church and from 
within the faith adhered to the central conviction that 
Jesus’s two natures, human and divine, were both 
complete.  Only in this way would his mediation be true 
mediation.  If he were some type of intermediate being his 
presence would guide humanity not toward God, but away 
from God, resulting in separation rather than mediation.
133
  
As explained by Ratzinger, “[o]nly if he was really a man 
like us can he be our mediator, and only if he is really God, 
like God, does the mediation reach its goal.”134   
In Incarnation theologies, being mediator (or 
pathway) is an essential aspect of Christ’s liberation of 
humanity.  Ratzinger explains the theory as follows:  Jesus 
is the exemplary man, the Second Adam.
135
 The first 
Adam, the moment when God’s Idea of man first took 
shape, was but a first step in man’s process of becoming 
man.
136
  The first step involved the transition from mere 
life to mind.  The second step, accomplished in Jesus, the 
                                                 
133
 Id. at 163. 
134
 Id. at 166. 
135
 Holy Scripture refers to Jesus as the Second Adam. See id. at 236. 
136
 Ratzinger explains that, in the Bible, the word “Adam” expresses the 
unity of the whole creature “man.”  Id. at 236. 
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Second Adam, involved a more intense contact between 
humanity and God. 
 
Man came into existence out 
of the “clay” at the moment 
when a creature was no longer 
merely “there” but, over and 
above just being there and 
filling his needs, was aware of 
the whole.  But this step, 
through which logos, 
understanding, mind, first 
came into this world, is only 
completed when the Logos 
itself, the whole creative 
meaning, and man merge into 
each other.  Man’s full 
“hominization” presupposes 
God’s becoming man; only by 
this event is the Rubicon 
dividing the “animal” from the 
“logical” finally crossed for 
ever and the highest possible 
development accorded to the 
process [of humanity’s 
creation].”137    
 
It is in Jesus Christ, then, that humanity has reached its 
goal.
138
  It is openness to the infinite that is the true mark of 
man, and man is most complete when he is one with the 
infinite.  Jesus is “true man” because the person that is part 
and parcel of his human nature is one with God. 
                                                 
137
 Id. at 235. 
138
 As Ratzinger has stated elsewhere: “We can say that God created the 
universe in order to enter into a history of love with humankind.”  
Ratzinger, The Meaning, supra note 82, at 30. 
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 It is important to appreciate two distinct aspects of 
this Incarnation theory.  First, it is grounded in the 
understanding that there is one Divine Idea “man” that is 
fulfilled in Jesus Christ.
139
  This key point was uniformly 
held and taught by important and influential early Christian 
thinkers.
140
  Ratzinger explicitly made this point in a 1981 
Lenten homily entitled The Creation of the Human Being. 
141
  In that homily, Ratzinger explains that, in the biblical 
account of Creation, God reveals much insight about this 
Divine Idea: 
 
 Humanity is one Creation 
from God’s one Good Earth. 
 The human being comes into 
existence after God has 
breathed his breath into the 
body, when divine reality 
enters humanity—when God 
enters into his Creation. 
 Because divine reality is in 
humanity, each human being 
is known and loved by God, 
is willed, and is made in his 
image. 
                                                 
139
 Ratzinger makes this point only in passing in Ratzinger, Truth and 
Freedom, supra note 26, at 351.  
140
 See HENRI DE LUBAC, CATHOLICISM: CHRIST AND THE COMMON 
DESTINY OF MAN (Lacelot C. Sheppard & Sister Elizabeth Englund 
trans., Ignatius Press 1988) (1947) (citing and extensively quoting from 
the work of the Church Fathers and early Christian philosophers).  
Notably, Lubac’s work greatly influenced Ratzinger’s approach to faith 
and theology. 
141
 JOSEPH RATZINGER, The Creation of the Human Being, in IN THE 
BEGINNING . . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF 
CREATION AND THE FALL, supra note 82, at 41-58 [hereinafter 
Ratzinger, The Creation]. 
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 Each human being realizes 
the One project of God, and 
has his or her origin in the 
same Creative Idea of God. 
 To be the image of God 
implies an inherent capacity 
for relationship and capacity 
for God.  
 The distinctive mark of the 
human being is the capability 
to think and to pray; humans 
are beings of word and 
love—beings moving toward 
Another.
142
   
 
Jesus is the exemplary man or Last Adam because, in Jesus, 
the person inherent to his human nature is integrated with 
his divinity and is completely open to God.  God’s one Idea 
“man” has thus achieved the goal of being completely open 
to God. 
This tells us about God’s goal for each human 
being.  The “true man”—the man conforming with the 
Divine Idea “man”—is a person in union with God in a 
manner akin to Jesus, but in a manner that is only possible 
in and through Jesus.  And this leads to the second 
important aspect of the Incarnation theory.  It helps clarify 
how it is that Jesus Christ enables humanity to achieve 
God’s goal. 
In the article Retrieving the Tradition, Ratzinger 
points out that in integrating knowledge about the human 
person with knowledge of Christ, two main ideas emerge.  
One is the idea that the human person in history is “being 
on the way” towards fuller integration into Divine Love.  
The second idea has bearing on how Jesus enables 
                                                 
142
 Id. at 44-48.  
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humanity, as a unity, to achieve God’s goal.  Jesus Christ is 
the all-encompassing space in which the “we” of human 
beings gather on the way to the Father, into which the Holy 
Spirit, Love, gathers humanity.
143
   
The vision, then, is one in which the Holy Spirit 
(the means through which Jesus Christ remains present in 
history) is within human beings, enabling and enhancing 
the inherent human capacity to love God and the inherent 
relativity (Love) within human beings.  In turn, that Love 
within human beings is held together in unity and in the 
space, openness, or path that is Jesus Christ, thereby linking 
united human love with God’s love.   
As pointed out by Ratzinger, this vision necessarily 
implies the collective nature of man’s union with God.  
Love of God and love of neighbor are thus inherently and 
inextricably intertwined.  Within the human being there is a 
reality consisting of relativity, Love.  This relativity is 
ultimately reaching for God.  But it is affected by 
interactions with others.  Actions of “being-with” or 
“being-for” others enhances the movement towards God 
and vice versa.  The collective nature of humanity’s union 
with God means that the action of any one person affects 
the union of others with God.  Actions of “being-with” or 
“being-for” by any individual enhance the overall 
movement towards God; negative actions by any individual 
have a negative effect on the whole of humanity’s 
movement towards God. 
In humanity, then, from the beginning, heaven and 
earth touch.  In Jesus Christ the creation of humanity is 
brought to completion.  The pathway between heaven and 
earth is fully opened, and all integration or union between 
God and humanity—the one Divine Idea—will be by way 
of the divine person Jesus.  Thus, Jesus is “the way, and the 
truth, and the life" (Jn 14:6).  Jesus is the pathway that each 
                                                 
143
 See supra notes 113 to 122 and accompanying text. 
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human being must endeavor to follow during his or her 
lifetime in history.  By following Jesus Christ in one’s 
lifetime, one becomes, in reality, encompassed within 
Jesus’s one saving action.144  Each individual is saved only 
within the context of the whole.  Moreover, by virtue of 
being integrated with God, the plurality within the human 
unity—a multi-unity in Love—contributes to the fullness of 
the oneness of God. 
 
D.  Reprise of the Vision  
 
As demonstrated by the foregoing subsection, the 
Christian vision of freedom has layers of complexity.  The 
deeper the reflection is pushed—the more one uses human 
reasoning to assist in understanding God’s revelation—the 
more it becomes apparent that how freedom is used is 
important.  The Christian vision is based on an 
understanding of humanity and its history and destiny as 
revealed by God.  Human freedom depends on God and is 
freedom from sin.  This is so because the Creator of 
humanity is Reason and Love.  Each human being is a 
distinct being set free by the Creative Logos that is Love.  
Human life—the living out the freedom given by God—
should be a response to God.  That response is guided by 
and made possible by God, both by virtue of inherent 
capacities within the human person and by virtue of God’s 
                                                 
144
 In discussing Christian worship, which encompasses the entirety of 
one’s life, Ratzinger explains: “The fundamental principle of Christian 
worship is consequently this movement of exodus with its two-in-one 
direction toward God and fellowman.  By carrying humanity to God, 
Christ incorporates it in his salvation. . . . [H]e who was crucified has 
smelted the body of humanity into the Yes of worship.  [Christian 
sacrifice] is completely ‘anthropocentric’, entirely related to man, 
because it was radical theocentricity, delivery of the ’I‘ and therefore of 
the creature man to God. . . . The fundamental principle of sacrifice is 
not destruction but love.”  Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 
289. 
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revelation, especially the fullness of revelation in Jesus 
Christ. 
In particular, love is a capacity, an existential 
capacity that is itself a reality.  Love is a transcendent 
character within humans designed to reach beyond self, 
especially towards God but also towards other human 
beings.  The purpose and goal of this capacity in the human 
person is re-union with God, which depends on acting in 
accord with God, which means acting in accord with the 
truth at both the individual and collective levels.  It is this 
union with the transcendent that the human spirit is striving 
for and that gives rise to the human yearning for freedom.  
It is this inherent capacity to seek God that is the truly 
distinguishing characteristic of humanity.   
Union with the Creator depends on thinking and 
acting in conformity with Eternal Reason and Love.  In 
practice, this means being receptive to God and other and 
acting in conformity with the fundamental anthropological 
pattern:  being-from, being-with, and being-for.  This is the 
meaning or intelligibility within man, and it is acting 
consistently with the meaning internal to man that 
constitutes genuine human freedom.
145
  The inviolable 
standards necessary for democratic society must be 
standards that safeguard genuine human freedom.  
Christian values provide just this type of standard.  They 
are values that have their origin from the Creator of 
humanity and the world and are fully consistent with the 
                                                 
145
 Because human freedom depends on grace, the Church and its 
sacraments, especially baptism and penance and the Eucharist, 
generally are crucial to attaining freedom.  The capacity to love God 
and remain in communion with him is dramatically enhanced by 
reception of grace through the sacraments.  For example, Ratzinger has 
described the Eucharistic community as a “holy thing” granted to the 
Church as the “real bond of unity.”  See Ratzinger, Introduction, supra 
note 77, at 334.  Further, the Church is to be understood as the “center 
of the Spirit’s activity in the world.”  Id. at 335-36.    
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pattern of love, the pattern of being-from, being-with, and 
being-for.   
 
V. Ordering Freedom in Accord with the Human 
Spirit and Democratic Ideals 
 
The well-reasoned alternative vision of human 
freedom presented by Ratzinger clarifies the argument that 
freedom is promoted and safeguarded only when core 
Christian moral insights provide the point of reference for 
law and justice.  As noted at the outset, Ratzinger has 
supplemented his argument with analysis of why prevalent 
political theories of the modern era have failed.  Part I of 
this article presented part of Ratzinger’s assessment of the 
shortcomings of modernity’s radical notion of human 
freedom.  This part of the article highlights another aspect 
of the assessment, namely, that modernity’s typical 
approach to freedom has missed its mark precisely because 
of its failure to be guided by the fundamental pattern of 
love imprinted within every human being.  It then briefly 
discusses certain aspects of how use of fundamental 
Christian insights can be fully consistent with key ideals 
held in a pluralistic democratic society. 
 
A. Modern Ideas of Freedom Are in Opposition 
to the Essence of the Human Person 
 
In Truth and Freedom,
146
 published in 1996, 
Ratzinger identifies fundamental elements of modern 
approaches to freedom
 147
 and shows that these elements 
                                                 
146
 Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 337-53. 
147
 Ratzinger traces the evolution from Luther’s struggle for freedom of 
conscience in the religious sphere; to the middle phrase characterized 
by Kant’s call to use “pure reason,” and where two distinct approaches 
emerged: a natural rights orientation grounded in a metaphysical idea, 
and a radical anarchic approach wherein no right order exists in nature 
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tend to allow humans to act in opposition to the internal 
striving of the human spirit.  Ratzinger’s analysis supports 
the vision that freedom is inherently linked to truth and, 
specifically, the truth regarding the essence of human 
existence.  He shows that modernity’s anarchical 
conception of freedom cannot be correct because it allows 
humans to regard the “fundamental figure of human 
existence” as itself an attack on freedom.  
Ratzinger’s analysis is based on the principle that 
the fundamental pattern of human existence is a being 
“from,” “with,” and “for” another. 148  Ratzinger points out 
                                                                                                 
(arising from Rousseau’s ideas); to the later Marxist approaches.  Id. at 
340-43.  He concludes that the widespread view of freedom today is 
characterized by the individualistic ideology which was a component of 
all Enlightenment thought by anarchic tendencies (human will is the 
sole norm of human action) and by the Marxist tendency to rely on 
structures and systems to bring about justice.  Id. at 342-43.  Despite 
failures to bring about a sense of justice, Ratzinger notes that the 
radical current of Enlightenment has not lost its appeal.  Fascination for 
the grand promise of emancipation made at the inception of modernity 
remains.  Id. at 344.  To Ratzinger, then, the question “What is 
freedom?” cannot be avoided and involves issues of “what man is and 
how he can live rightly both individually and collectively.”  Id. at 338-
40, 344. 
148
 Id. at 346. Notably, the philosophical or theological basis for 
understanding human beings as “beings from, with, and for” is 
suggested only in passing in Truth and Freedom.  Ratzinger points to 
the “hidden theological core” underlying the modern, anarchic 
conception of freedom: the desire to be “like a god who depends on 
nothing and no one, whose own freedom is not restricted by that of 
another.” Id. at 347.  But he also points to the theological error.  In this 
ideology the divinity is conceived as a pure egoism, which is the 
extreme opposite of the real essence of God as revealed by God in 
Jesus Christ.  In Jesus, God has revealed himself as relational: “by his 
very nature he is entirely being-for (Father), being-from (Son), and 
being-with (Holy Spirit).” Id. at 347.  For Ratzinger, this is the reason 
why the essence of human existence follows the pattern.  Resisting the 
pattern leads to dehumanization, which will result in the destruction of 
the human being through the destruction of the truth of the human 
being.  Id. at 347. 
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that this fundamental anthropological pattern is most 
starkly presented by the unborn child.  The being of the 
unborn child is only from and through the mother and can 
survive only by physically being with the mother.  The 
“being-with” of the child prompts the being of the mother 
to become a “being for.”  Importantly, the pattern remains 
after the child is born.  The outward form of the “being-
from and -with” may change as the child matures.  The 
child nonetheless remains dependent; and although the 
mother may assign the care of the child to another, there 
remains “a ‘from’ that demands a ‘for.’”149  Furthermore, 
Ratzinger points out that this pattern remains even in 
adults: “Even the adult can exist only with and from 
another, and is thus continually thrown back on that being-
for which is the very thing he would like to shut out.”150   
                                                 
149
 Id. at 346. 
150
Id. at 346.  Notably, this important point—the all-encompassing 
nature of the “from” and “for” pattern—is illustrated more thoroughly 
by Ratzinger in other writings.  Ratzinger links the pattern to 
humanity’s corporality, i.e., his being “spirit in body.”  See Ratzinger, 
Introduction, supra note 77.  Corporality necessitates physical 
dependence on those immediately surrounding a human being 
(including both parentage and mutual daily care); but this dependence 
extends to needs of the spirit in man and, as well, extends to 
dependence on the past and future of mankind.  By way of example, he 
points to the human need for language (to which the whole of history 
has contributed); for culture (the “web of history that impinges on the 
individual through speech and social communication”); and for a future 
(“man is a being who lives for the future, who continually takes care to 
plan ahead beyond the passing moment and could no longer exist if he 
suddenly found himself without a future”).  Id. at 245-48. 
Another important insight on the human need for other was 
made by Ratzinger in a 1981 Lenten homily: “Human beings have their 
selves not only in themselves but also outside of themselves: they live 
in those whom they love and in those who love them and to whom they 
are ‘present.’” See JOSEPH RATZINGER, Sin and Salvation, in IN THE 
BEGINNING . . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF 
CREATION AND THE FALL, supra note 82, at 72. 
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Ratzinger then focuses on the fact that man in 
contemporary society mightily resists this fundamental 
pattern.  “[M]an quite spontaneously takes for granted the 
being-for of others in the form of today’s network of 
service systems, yet if he had his way he would prefer not 
to be forced to participate in such a “from” and “for,” but 
would like to become wholly independent, and to be able to 
do and not to do just what he pleases.”151  Ratzinger notes 
that it is this modern attitude or demand for freedom that is 
reflected in society’s acceptance of abortion.  “[A]bortion 
appears as a right of freedom.”  The woman “must have the 
power to make decisions about her own life, and no one 
else can – so we are told – impose from the outside any 
ultimately binding norm.”152  Ratzinger’s point of emphasis 
is that, from the modern perspective of freedom, requiring a 
woman to act in accord with the basic anthropologic pattern 
is perceived as an attack on freedom.
153
  This example 
supports Ratzinger’s key argument that a conception of 
freedom that demands liberation from the very essence of 
what it means to be human simply cannot be correct.  As he 
states, “exactly what sort of freedom has the right to annul 
another’s freedom as soon as it begins?”154 
Genuine human freedom, therefore, cannot rest on 
the individualistic model of radical autonomy and self-
sufficiency.  The complex weave of human dependencies 
does not allow this approach.  Rather, Ratzinger explains, 
“Man’s freedom is shared freedom, freedom in the conjoint 
existence of liberties that limit and thus sustain one 
                                                 
151
 Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 346-47. 
152
 Id. at 346. 
153
 Id. at 347. 
154
 That society would allow real but secondary interests to prevail over 
the fundamental right to life also shows that modernity’s decision to 
restrict reason results in reason being used to justify the irrational.  
JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 63 
(2006).  
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another.”155  This conception of freedom thus necessarily 
requires a right or just ordering of rights and relationships: 
an “ordered communion of freedoms.”156  This sort of 
“right ordering” requires laws in society that are grounded 
in standards or values that foster human action consistent 
with the truth regarding the essence of human existence.  
This reference to “right ordering” in Truth and Freedom is 
very similar to a statement expressed in the Instruction on 
Christian Freedom and Liberation issued by the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: 
 
Truth and justice are therefore 
the measure of true freedom. . 
. . Far from being achieved in 
total self-sufficiency and an 
absence of relationships, 
freedom only truly exists 
where reciprocal bonds, 
governed by truth and justice, 
link people to one another.  
But for such bonds to be 
possible, each person must 
live in the truth.
157
 
 
This is, then, but another way of saying that each person 
must live in conformity with the intelligibility within man, 
the pattern of “being-from,” “being-with,” and “being-for.” 
 
                                                 
155
 Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 348. 
156
 Id. at 352. 
157
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #26.  In Truth and Freedom, Ratzinger 
shows that freedom is enhanced by heightened awareness of 
responsibility and acceptance of ever greater fraternal bonds and that 
responsibility, living in response to what the human being is in truth, 
entails being guided by the Decalogue, unfolded in rational 
understanding. Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 349-
51.   
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B. Ordering Freedom in Love Is Consistent with 
Democratic Ideals 
 
Ratzinger’s vision for protecting freedom in society 
rests on three points.   First, freedom is safeguarded only 
when democratic government and the majority vote are 
limited by inviolable moral standards.  Second, 
safeguarding genuine freedom—freedom consistent with 
the internal yearning for the transcendent—requires that the 
inviolable standards be consistent with the intelligibility 
within man—the “being-from,” “being-with,” and “being-
for” pattern impressed on the human spirit by virtue of 
being a creature of God.  Third, core Christian insights and 
values properly used to inform the ordering of relationships 
in society can achieve this requisite conformity to Eternal 
Reason and Love.  As noted, this “right ordering” requires 
laws in society that are grounded in standards or values that 
foster human action consistent with the truth.  Further, 
although Ratzinger agrees with the idea of a secular state, 
he advocates that the State has a role in prudently fostering 
respect for those values, including expecting reverence and 
respect for God and holy things, and encouraging serious 
study of questions such as the existence of and nature of 
God.
158
  This vision remains consistent with key 
                                                 
158
 See, e.g., Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 218-
20.  A key reason for this type of state action is the need for sufficient 
unity among the citizens regarding the values deemed inviolable.  See 
Ratzinger, Freedom and Constraint, supra note 21, at 188 
(“Ultimately, the democratic system can only function if certain 
fundamental values . . . are recognized as valid by everyone . . . an 
ethos which is jointly accepted and maintained even if its rational basis 
cannot be established absolutely and conclusively”). See also 
Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 205 (“[Pluralist 
democracy, in itself, does not] unite[] its citizens in a fundamental 
assent to the state;” for its foundations, it depends on other powers and 
forces outside of itself); Ratzinger, Luther, supra note 21, at 131 
(noting that “a formal unity without clear content is fundamentally no 
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democratic ideals.  It is beyond the scope of this article to 
discuss this point in detail, but it is important to recognize 
that Ratzinger has addressed this concern.  
 From a practical perspective, Ratzinger recognizes 
the need to adhere to two key principles in carrying out the 
exchange between politics and faith.  First, he readily 
acknowledges the need to maintain the properly distinct 
and delimited spheres of Church and State.
159
  Ratzinger 
notes that the Christian faith brought about the secular 
state, a society in which the political realm is limited and 
provides space for freedom of conscience.
160
  The State is 
responsible for peace and justice, and governs on the basis 
                                                                                                 
unity at all; unity based on common skepticism and not knowledge is, 
in essence, based on capitulation). 
Ratzinger is clear, however, in placing the primary 
responsibility for cultivating the spiritual foundation of society on the 
Church and Christians. Id.  See also JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom, 
Law, and the Good, in VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 52 (2006) 
(emphasizing the public task of Christian churches in that they must be 
free “to address the freedom of all human beings so the moral forces of 
history may remain forces in the present”); JOSEPH RATZINGER, 
Biblical Aspects of the Question of Faith and Politics, in CHURCH, 
ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 
12, at 147, 151 [hereinafter Ratzinger, Biblical Aspects] (The core 
responsible political activity is to nurture public acceptance of the 
validity of morality and God’s commandments.). 
159
 See, e.g., Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 161-62 
(noting that “[w]here the Church itself becomes the state, freedom 
becomes lost.”  But freedom is also lost when the Church is precluded 
from being a public and publically relevant authority).  
160
 See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Conscience in Its Age, in CHURCH, 
ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 
12, at 165, 174 [hereinafter Ratzinger, Conscience] (noting that, by 
altering the ancient practice of state authority over religion, Jesus set a 
limit to earthly authority and proclaimed the freedom of the person that 
transcends all political systems); Ratzinger, Biblical Aspects, supra 
note 158, at 148-49; JOSEPH RATZINGER, Searching for Peace, in 
VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 114 (2006). 
62
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 9, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 4
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol9/iss4/4
Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3 
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 420 
 
of reason.
161
  But Church and State have a common moral 
responsibility based on the essence of man and the essence 
of justice.
162
  Thus, although politics is the realm of reason, 
Ratzinger emphasizes that political reason must include 
moral reason.
163
  Further, it cannot be limited to mere 
technological and calculating reason, a reason that has cut 
off its historical roots, namely, the basic memory of 
mankind.
164
  Because of modernity’s self-imposed 
narrowing of reason, the evidential character of a 
fundamental intuition common to all the great cultures has 
been eroded, namely, the conviction regarding: 
 
[T]he doctrine of objective 
values expressed in the Being 
of the world; the belief that 
attitudes exist that correspond 
to the message of the universe 
and are true and therefore 
good, and that other attitudes 
                                                 
161
 See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Searching for Peace, in VALUES IN A 
TIME OF UPHEAVAL 22-24 (2006).. 
162
 See, e.g., id. at 114.  Ratzinger frequently explains that the essence 
of justice depends on a universal criterion, as opposed to merely 
pragmatic criteria determined by the group or by majority vote.  See, 
e.g., Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 133-37 (noting that, 
in Greek and Roman philosophy of the state, a state that constructs 
justice only on the basis of majority opinions sinks down to the level of 
the “robber band”).  
163
 See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, NEED ARTICLE NAME, in VALUES 
IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 24 (2006); Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, 
supra note 12, 216-17. 
164
 See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF 
CULTURES 36-43 (2006) (explaining the confused ideology of freedom 
that has resulted from modern philosophy’s tendency to limit reason to 
what is considered objectively verifiable fact, and to see issues only in 
terms of feasibility, functionality, and effectiveness and characterizing 
such an approach to reasoning as being radically opposed to all other 
historical cultures of humanity). 
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likewise exist that are 
genuinely and always false 
because they contradict Being. 
. . . [and thus] the conviction 
that man’s Being contains an 
imperative; the conviction that 
he does not himself invent 
morality on the basis of 
calculations of expediency but 
rather finds it already present 
in the essence of things.
165
 
 
In governing, the State should make full use of reason’s 
capacity to discern the moral message—the intelligible 
meaning—within creation.  And, in doing so, the State 
should recognize that the discernment process is greatly 
assisted by the insights of faith.
166
    
For its part, the Church’s primary role is to 
evangelize and bring about the inner conversion of 
                                                 
165
 Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 34-36 (emphasis in 
original). 
166
 Ratzinger explains that modernity’s self-limitation of reason has 
meant that what is most specific to man—moral reasoning—has been 
unjustifiably delimited to the subjective realm.  He notes that, in reality, 
reason can perceive more than quantitative facts.  Creation reveals a 
moral message that is discernible by use of reason, especially when 
assisted by faith and when it draws upon the experience of human 
existence over time.  Full use of moral reasoning is reasoning in the 
highest sense. The imposed limitation of reason to quantifiable facts 
precludes the scientific method from attaining its aim of garnering 
knowledge most in accord with reality; and, conversely, full use of 
reason’s capabilities will more readily attain knowledge in accord with 
reality.  Thus, “the great ethical insights of mankind are just as rational 
and just as true as—indeed, more true than—the experimental 
knowledge of the realm of the natural sciences and technology.  They 
are more true, because they touch more deeply the essential character 
of Being and have a more decisive significance for the humanity of 
man.”  Id. at 37-42. 
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individuals.  The political and economic running of society 
is not a direct part of the Church’s mission, but Jesus 
“entrusted to [the Church] the word of truth which is 
capable of enlightening consciences.”167  The power of the 
Gospel, as lived by convicted Christians, can “penetrate[] 
the human community and its history,” thereby purifying 
and sustaining a culture of life consistent with the 
Beatitudes.
168
  This includes nurturing the idea of 
conscience as recognition of man as creation, thereby 
fostering respect for the Creator in man as opposed to the 
more common notion of conscience being a wholly 
independent internal forum for deciding what is good or 
evil.
169
  But the Church in various institutional forms, and 
especially in and through the activities of individuals, can 
and also must make claims and demands on public law.
170
   
                                                 
167
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #61. 
168
 Id. at #62. See also ICATL, supra not 44, at ch. XI, #8 (“[I]t is only 
by making appeal to the ‘moral potential’ of the person and to the 
constant need for interior conversion, that social change will be brought 
about which will be truly in the service of man.  For it will only be in 
the measure that they collaborate freely in these necessary changes 
through their own initiative and in solidarity, that people, awakened to 
a sense of their responsibility, will grow in humanity.  The inversion of 
morality and structures is steeped in a materialist anthropology which is 
incompatible with the dignity of mankind”). 
169
 See Ratzinger, Conscience, supra note 160, at 169-70 (quoting 
Reinhold Schneider: “Conscience is knowledge of responsibility for the 
whole of creation and before him who has made it.”).  Ratzinger agrees 
that a person must follow a clear verdict of conscience, but stresses that 
this must be understood in conjunction with the reality that conscience 
cannot be identified with a person’s subjective certainty about himself 
and his moral conduct (this would in fact enslave persons by making 
them dependent on prevailing opinions of the day), and also that 
conscience can err.  See JOSEPH RATZINGER, If You Want Peace. . . , in 
VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 75-100 (2006). 
170
 See Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 163 (noting that 
“the Church cannot simply retreat into the private sphere”).  In 
addition, the Church has societal function.  As explained by Ratzinger 
in Introduction to Christianity, the Church and being Christian relate to 
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In making demands on the public law, however, 
Ratzinger emphasizes the need to focus on essential core 
values bearing on freedom.  This is the second key 
principle to keep in mind in carrying out the exchange 
between politics and faith.  It is an important way of 
preventing overreaching that would upset a proper Church-
State balance.  At times Ratzinger points to certain core 
essentials, namely, human dignity and human rights 
grounded in man as the image of God; marriage, and 
family, grounded in the truth of the human person; and 
reverence for God and to that which is holy to other 
persons.
171
  More often, Ratzinger points to the Decalogue 
as a starting point, because it constitutes a “sublime 
expression” of moral reason and, as such, coincides in 
many ways with the great ethical traditions of other 
religions.
172
  To Ratzinger, respect for the Creator in man 
entails living “as an answer – as a response to what we are 
in truth.”173  And the Decalogue, with its origin from the 
Creator, is a “self-presentation and self-exhibition of God,” 
and thus a “luminous manifestation of his truth.”174  
Notably, he stresses the need to continually unfold the 
meaning of the Decalogue, recognizing that coming to 
appreciate the whole of the truth requires an active process 
in which “reason’s entire quest for the criteria of our 
                                                                                                 
the fact that each human must work out his freedom within the 
“framework of the already existing whole of human life that stamps and 
molds him;” their purpose is “to save history as history and to break 
through or transform the collective grid that forms the site of human 
existence.”  Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, 247-48. 
171
 See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Europe’s Identity, in VALUES IN A 
TIME OF UPHEAVAL 147-49 (2006). 
172
 See JOSEPH RATZINGER, To Change or Preserve, in VALUES IN A 
TIME OF UPHEAVAL 29 (2006).  
173
 See Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 349-51. 
174
 Id.  
66
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 9, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 4
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol9/iss4/4
Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3 
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 424 
 
responsibility truly comes into its own.”175  To Ratzinger, 
this is simply part and parcel of Christianity’s synthesis of 
faith and reason: reason needs faith, but faith also, precisely 
as faith, must work in conjunction with reason.
176
     
Ratzinger also is convinced that judicious use of 
core Christian insights and values to inform the ordering of 
relationships in society helps maintain full consistency with 
notions of tolerance.  His reasoning on this issue has two 
aspects to it.  First, Ratzinger has explained that use of 
Christian insights as the inviolable point of reference for 
law and justice in society should not be considered an 
unjust imposition of values.  The insights reflect the 
intelligibility in things or the meaning or truth in Creation.  
And, as explained by Ratzinger, there is in man—at the 
ontological level—an expectation of sorts, a primal 
knowledge or remembrance of the good and true that needs 
help from without to become aware of its own self.
177
  This 
is the ontological level of the human conscience.  He 
explains:  
 
This anamnesis of our origin, 
resulting from the fact that our 
being is constitutively in 
keeping with God, is not a 
                                                 
175
 Id. (noting that freedom is enhanced by heightened awareness of 
responsibility—living in response to what the human being is in truth—
which entails being guided by the Decalogue, unfolded in rational 
understanding). 
176
 Ratzinger has explained the relationship between faith and reason as 
follows: “[F]aith demands and reveals reason, understands itself as the 
environment of reason, so that faith is not correct if the insights to 
which it leads are not at least rudimentarily reasonable, while on the 
other hand reason cuts the ground from beneath its feet if it does away 
with faith.”  Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 158. 
177
 JOSEPH RATZINGER, If You Want Peace: Conscience and Truth, in 
VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 90-95 (2006) (explaining the classical 
concept of synderesis as anamnesis of the Creator existing at the 
ontological level of conscience). 
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knowledge articulated in 
concepts, a treasure store of 
retrievable contents.  It is an 
inner sense, a capacity for 
recognition, in such a way that 
the one addressed recognizes 
in himself an echo of what is 
said to him.  If he does not 
hide from his own self, he 
comes to the insight: this is 
the goal toward which my 
whole being tends, this is 
where I want to go.  This 
anamnesis of the Creator, 
which is identical with the 
foundations of our existence, 
is the reason that mission is 
both possible and justified.
178
   
 
This primal knowledge, of course, can become distorted or 
greatly weakened by culture.  Nonetheless, when the 
Church or others present and explain Christian values, it 
can spark recognition.  This is not an imposition, but, 
rather, there is a fusion that activates the capacity to receive 
the truth.
179
   
Second, because Christian insights and values are 
grounded in Love, their use as the inviolable reference 
should not lead to inappropriate intolerance for other 
perspectives.  Rather, as explained by Ratzinger, the surest 
guarantee of tolerance is the identity of Truth and Love.  
On the one hand this means that, in an appropriate praxis of 
freedom, the evangelical mission of the Church and 
Christians will be carried out with Love, which necessarily 
implies respect for religious liberty freedom in civil 
                                                 
178
 Id. at 92. 
179
 Id. at 92-94.  
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society.
180
  On a deeper level, however, the identity of 
Truth and Love suggests that typical notions of tolerance 
reflect confusion about the meaning of genuine human 
freedom.  The typical idea of tolerance is that it is the 
attitude of respect for the views of others that safeguards 
freedom.
181
  From the Christian perspective of human 
freedom, it is the use of core Christian values or insights as 
a point of reference for law and justice that is itself the 
safeguard for freedom.  Tolerance is simply the appropriate 
attitude to have since matters of conscience should not be 
coerced.  This is a subtle but real distinction.  The 
persuasiveness of Ratzinger’s view—as to both aspects of 
notions of tolerance—is tied to careful and prudent use of 
essential core values.    
                                                 
180
 See JOSEPH RATZINGER, TRUTH AND TOLERANCE: CHRISTIAN 
BELIEF AND WORLD RELIGIONS 231 (Henry Taylor trans., Ignatius 
Press 1st Am. ed. 2004). See also Letter from Benedict XVI, Supreme 
Pontiff, to the Bishops, Priests, and Deacons; Men and Women 
Religious; and all the Lay Faithful on Christian Love,  (June 29, 2009) 
(on file with author), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents
/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html, at #2 (noting 
that “[t]ruth needs to be sought, found and expressed with the 
‘economy’ of charity, but charity in its turn needs to be understood, 
confirmed and practiced in the light of the truth”). See also Declaration 
on Religious Freedom  (DIGNITATIS HUMANAE): On the Right of the 
Person and of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters 
Religious), promulgated by Pope Paul VI, December 7, 1965 (available 
at 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/docume
nts/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html) (last accessed 
4/28/2014). 
181
 For example, in a law review article calling for the abandonment of 
the neutrality principle, Dean Steven Smith explains that the 
“restoration of tolerance” as a “respectable attitude” is justified.  He 
explains that tolerance – respect for the views of those who disagree 
with the substantive values selected by society – will protect their 
liberty.  See Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 Calif. 
L. Rev. 305 (1990). 
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Ratzinger has thus addressed the major concerns 
that relate to use of core Christian insights as the inviolable 
standard in a pluralistic democratic society.  The Christian 
vision, when fully and properly understood, remains 
consistent with key democratic ideals.        
 
V. Conclusion 
 
A key purpose of this article has been to explain, in 
a comprehensive way, a well-reasoned alternative 
perspective of human freedom that brings to light the fact 
that the doctrine of neutrality presents a real obstacle to 
freedom in democratic society.  A sound argument exists to 
support the claim that liberty and justice in society depend 
on state recognition of, and prudent use of, core Christian 
values in lawmaking and policy-making.
182
   A strong case 
has been made that judgments concerning the ends in life 
worthy of pursuit are not solely subjective.  Rather, 
freedom is an integral aspect of the human person, and, 
thus, how freedom is used matters.  The heart of the 
message is that Christian values have their origin from the 
transcendent and, more specifically, from the Creator of 
humanity and the world.  As such, these values are 
necessarily consistent with the meaning or intelligibility in 
creation and will thereby promote genuine human freedom.  
Personal choices about how to live do matter, and it should 
be permissible for the State—through prudent adherence to 
core values—to foster a culture in which persons can more 
readily live in a genuinely human way.   
                                                 
182
 It is appropriate to reiterate that this would not necessarily mean a 
return to state practices struck down by the Court due to Establishment 
Clause concerns.  Past reliance on Christian values in fashioning laws 
may not always have been “prudent” and may have involved values 
beyond the realm appropriately considered “core values.”  Cf. 
Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 212 (noting that 
Christians have at times in the past expected too much from the 
“earthly city”).  
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From this alternative perspective, the essence of 
human freedom is being receptive to God the Creator, and 
acting consistent with the pattern impressed on the human 
spirit by virtue of being a creature of God.
183
  This view of 
freedom is of course intimately bound-up with belief in 
God.  But the counter-perspective—the view associated 
with the radial philosophy of freedom and, ultimately, the 
principle of liberal neutrality—similarly has a theological 
basis, namely, the rejection of belief in God the Creator.
184
  
A rejection that is played out by the banishment of ideas 
related to religion and morality to the subjective realm.
185
   
Indeed, in Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, Ratzinger 
emphasized that the ultimate divide in contemporary 
society rests on the question of the existence of God:    
  
The real antagonism typical of 
today’s world is not that 
between diverse religious 
cultures; rather, it is the 
antagonism between the 
                                                 
183
 Indeed, Ratzinger has stated that “[i]f there is no longer any 
obligation to which [man] can and must respond in freedom, then there 
is no longer any realm of freedom at all.”  Ratzinger, A Turning Point, 
supra note 11, at 41. 
184
 Ratzinger has explained that behind the radical philosophy of 
freedom “there stands a programme which must ultimately be labeled 
theological: God is no longer recognized as a reality standing over 
against man, but instead man may himself or herself become what he or 
she imagines a divinity would be if it existed. . . .”  Ratzinger, Freedom 
and Liberation, supra note 24, at 260.  
185
 See, e.g., Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 33-41 
(noting that the consequence of materialism and the narrowing of 
reason is that “[m]orality, just like religion, now belongs to the realm of 
the subjective.  If it is subjective, then it is something posited by man.  
It does not precede vis-à-vis us: we precede it and fashion it.  This 
movement of [separating the world of feelings and the world of facts] . 
. . essentially knows no limits. . . . Calculation rules, and power rules.  
Morality has surrendered.”). 
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radical emancipation of man 
from God, from the roots of 
life, on the one hand, and the 
great religious cultures, on the 
other.  If we come to 
experience a clash of cultures . 
. . . [it] will be between this 
radical emancipation of man 
and the great historical 
cultures.  Accordingly, [the 
strategy of using constitutions 
to keep God out of the public 
realm] is not the expression of 
tolerance that wishes to 
protect the non-theistic 
religions and the dignity of 
atheists and agnostics; rather, 
it is the expression of a 
consciousness that would like 
to see God eradicated once 
and for all from the public life 
of humanity and shut up in the 
subjective sphere of cultural 
residues from the past.  In this 
way relativism, which is the 
starting point of the whole 
process, becomes a 
dogmatism that believes itself 
in possession of the definitive 
knowledge of human reason, 
with the right to consider 
everything else merely as a 
stage in human history that is 
basically obsolete and 
deserves to be relativized.  In 
reality, this means that we 
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have need of roots if we are to 
survive and that we must not 
lose sight of God if we do not 
want human dignity to 
disappear.
186
     
 
This is strong language from a respected political thinker, 
and the relativism of which he speaks is simply another 
way of discussing neutrality.  In the Crisis of Cultures and 
other writings, Ratzinger has addressed the reasonableness 
of belief in creation
187
 and the reasonableness of faith.
188
  
                                                 
186
 JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 44 
(2006) (The phrase “the strategy of using constitutions to keep God out 
of the public realm” was substituted for the phrase “the refusal to refer 
to God in the Constitution,” in which Ratzinger was referring to the 
European constitution).   
187
 For example, Ratzinger has explained that belief in Creation is 
reasonable, and, further, that “even from the perspective of the data of 
the natural sciences it is the ‘better hypothesis,’ offering a fuller and 
better explanation than any of the other theories.”  See Ratzinger, God 
the Creator, supra note 82, at 17.  In the second homily, Ratzinger 
explains that the scientific-based theories hinge on the entire ensemble 
of nature arising out of errors and dissonances and that some scientists 
acknowledge the absurdness of the theories but, nonetheless, cannot 
break out of the scientific mindset because “the scientific method 
demands that a question not be permitted to which the answer would 
have to be God.”  Ratzinger, The Meaning, supra note 82, at 22-25. 
188
 In Crisis of Cultures, Ratzinger explains that science cannot prove 
that God does not exist, and, if a person searches for God, certainty can 
be reached as to God’s existence.  The assurance arises in part the way 
faith in other aspects of a technology-based society arises:  we place 
trust in others who are qualified, credible and have knowledge when 
the validity of that trust is verified in daily experiences.  A relationship 
with God always involves relationship with other humans.  Over time, 
the living encounter with others that is inherently part of faith (the 
encounter with God and other humans) leads to certainty.  Faith is 
transformed to knowledge.  “The experience builds and comes to 
possess an evidentiary character that assures us.”  JOSEPH RATZINGER, 
CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 79-82, 103-110 (2006).  
Ratzinger notes that seeking knowledge of God is not irrational.   
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In light of the failures of the modern political freedom 
movements and the thorough and well-reasoned case 
supporting the prudent use of core Christian values in 
democratic society, it is reasonable to conclude that a more 
moderate use of neutrality principles will better safeguard 
liberty and justice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                 
Rather, what is being sought is actually the very foundation of 
rationality.  Id. at 89-90. 
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